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ABORTION PRIVILEGE
Ederlina Co
ABSTRACT
This Article launches a critical dialogue about the abortion
privilege. On the one hand, most abortion patients are low
income or live below the poverty line and are disproportionately
women of color. Many of these patients encounter multiple
restrictions on abortion and must travel lengthy distances to
abortion care facilities. These patients take center stage in
abortion rights cases and in abortion rights discourse. On the
other hand, there is a smaller but not insignificant group of
abortion patients for whom abortion care is paid for by private
or public health insurance or available out-of-pocket funds.
Many of these patients live in states where abortion is
unrestricted, and abortion care facilities are accessible often in
the county in which they live. These patients experience abortion
as a form of ordinary health care and rarely show up in abortion
rights cases and abortion rights discourse. They have the
abortion privilege.
This Article reveals the abortion privilege and contends that
its recognition and thoughtful incorporation into abortion rights
law and discourse could help redistribute the oppressive load
women without the same privilege carry in connection with the
right and help shore up the abortion right. First, demonstrating
widespread reliance on abortion, including by women with the
abortion privilege, is crucial to the stare decisis argument to
uphold Roe v. Wade. Demonstrating widespread reliance on
abortion would also help reduce the abortion stigma, which is
both harmful to women and makes demonstrating widespread
reliance on abortion so difficult in the first place. Second, the
abortion debate and abortion itself has changed, but women’s
 Associate Professor of Law, Legal Practice, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School
of Law. Thank you to Leslie Jacobs, Paula Manning, and Rachael Salcido for their insightful
comments and helpful feedback, and to Natalie Dimas for her superb research assistance.

1

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033863

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2

FALL 2021

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

experience with abortion as a form of ordinary health care has
not surfaced as part of the public narrative about abortion. Such
a narrative demonstrates that abortion is like other medical
procedures and confirms that women have the knowledge to
decide the outcome of their pregnancies without state
intervention. Although not everyone may be willing to see
abortion as ordinary health care today, they may be open to
seeing it that way in the future if we begin to tell that story.
Finally, as equality re-emerges as a prominent theme in legal and
political arguments in support of the abortion right, to advance
that argument with integrity and to coalesce a base of support
around it, there must be concerted efforts within the abortion
rights movement to acknowledge and reckon with the inequalities
among women who make the abortion decision. The abortion
privilege framework is designed to recognize these inequalities
and prompt efforts to equalize them. In addition, the framework
is designed to preempt the deprioritization of women without the
same privilege and make clear to privilege holders that the
abortion privilege perpetuates their inequality, too.
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INTRODUCTION

Even as one in four women in the United States continue to rely on
abortion care,1 the year 2021 highlighted once more how fragile
1. RACHEL K. JONES ET AL., GUTTMACHER INST., ABORTION INCIDENCE AND SERVICE
AVAILABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017, at 3 (Michael Klitsch ed., 2019), https://
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reproductive rights and justice law is—particularly as it relates to the
abortion right. At the federal level, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization to
consider the constitutionality of Mississippi’s ban on abortion after
fifteen weeks of pregnancy.2 In Dobbs, the Court could overturn Roe v.
Wade or further curtail the abortion right by permitting states to ban
abortion prior to viability.3 In addition, in Whole Woman’s Health v.
Jackson, the Court refused to grant injunctive relief to prevent Texas’
ban on abortion after six weeks of pregnancy from taking effect, resulting
in abortion care becoming largely unavailable in that state while the
lower courts decide the constitutionality of the law.4 Meanwhile, at the
state level, states enacted 106 new abortion restrictions, marking the
highest number of restrictions on abortion care since the Court decided
Roe.5
Although reproductive rights and justice advocates have held the
legal line against most attempts to ban or unduly restrict abortion,
primarily by prevailing in court challenges to various state laws,6 after
almost five decades of legalized abortion in the United States,7 many no
longer wonder whether but when an attempt to permanently ban
abortion will be successful.8 The conservative shift at the Supreme Court
www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/abortion-incidence-service-availabilityus-2017.pdf.
2. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021); Petition
for Writ of Certiorari, Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 141 S. Ct. 2619
(2021) (No. 19-1392) (granting certiorari on the question of whether all pre-viability
prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional).
3. See id.; Greer Donley et al., The Messy Post-Roe Legal Future Awaiting America,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/09/after-roelegal-mess-future-abortion-rights/620134/.
4. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, No. 21-463, 2021 WL 5855551 (U.S. 2021);
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021); Adam Liptak, Supreme Court
Allows Challenge to Texas Abortion Law but Leaves It in Effect, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/10/us/politics/texas-abortion-supreme-court.html.
5. ELIZABETH NASH, GUTTMACHER INST., FOR THE FIRST TIME EVER, U.S. STATES
ENACTED MORE THAN 100 ABORTION RESTRICTIONS IN A SINGLE YEAR (2021), https://
www.guttmacher.org/print/article/2021/10/first-time-ever-us-states-enacted-more-100abortion-restrictions-single-year; DIANA GREENE FOSTER, THE TURNAWAY STUDY 3 (2020)
(“Political and legal efforts to restrict access to abortion have never been more intense than
they have been in the past decade.”).
6. See, e.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2132 (2020); Jackson
Women’s Health Org. v. Dobbs, 945 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 2019) (holding unconstitutional
Mississippi’s ban on abortion after fifteen weeks of pregnancy).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Donley et al., supra note 3 (“America now faces the very real possibility that in just
a few months’ time, the Supreme Court will interpret the U.S. Constitution to no longer
protect the right to abortion.”); FOSTER, supra note 5, at 3 (“[A]ccess to abortion is in greater
jeopardy than it has been since Roe was decided . . . .”).
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and in federal courts nationwide,9 the brazen attempts to ban abortion in
the face of established law,10 and the societal fatigue surrounding the
abortion issue11 beg the question: what, if anything, can shore up the
abortion right? This Article aims to help answer this question by starting
a critical dialogue about the abortion privilege.
On the one hand, most abortion patients are low income or live below
the poverty line and are disproportionately women of color.12 Many of
these patients encounter multiple state restrictions on abortion and must
travel lengthy distances to abortion care facilities.13 Take the case of
Maleeha.14 At age twenty, she had recently immigrated to the United
States and was living in Texas.15 She went to a “crisis pregnancy center”
to confirm her pregnancy, and workers there misled her to believe that
she could not obtain a medication abortion in Texas.16 As a sexual assault
survivor, she wanted a medication abortion to avoid having a pelvic exam
or surgical abortion.17 Ultimately, family friends helped her fund a flight
to Colorado Springs where she obtained the necessary abortion
medication.18 She noted that trying to navigate Texas abortion laws was
close to impossible.19 Women like Maleeha and stories like hers that
involve limited access to abortion care are familiar. These patients often
take center stage in abortion rights cases and in abortion rights
discourse.
9. John Wagner, Senate Confirms 200th Judicial Nominee from Trump, a Legacy that
Will Last Well Beyond November, WASH. POST (June 24, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-confirms-200th-judicial-nominee-from-trump-alegacy-that-will-last-well-beyond-november/2020/06/24/8e8d7048-b61a-11ea-a51055bf26485c93_story.html.
10. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
11. Lauren Kelley, Opinion, What if the Supreme Court Rules on Abortion and the
Country Shrugs?, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/
opinion/supreme-court-abortion-june-medical.html.
12. GUTTMACHER INST., INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://
www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb_induced_abortion.pdf.
13. See id. (stating that nearly forty million women of reproductive age, or fifty-eight
percent, live in one of the twenty-nine states hostile to abortion rights); see also JONES ET
AL., supra note 1, at 7; Abortion is a Common Experience for U.S. Women, Despite Dramatic
Declines in Rates, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/newsrelease/2017/abortion-common-experience-us-women-despite-dramatic-declines-rates
(noting that abortion restrictions “could have made abortion more difficult to access,”
especially for poor women and women of color).
14. Maleeha Aziz, Maleeha Aziz’s Abortion Story, WE TESTIFY, https://web.archive.org/
web/20210118094727/https://wetestify.org/author/maleeha/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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On the other hand, there is a smaller but not insignificant group of
abortion patients for whom abortion care is paid for by private or public
health insurance or available out-of-pocket funds.20 Many of these
patients live in states where abortion care is unrestricted, or the abortion
restrictions in place are not burdensome for them. 21 Abortion care
facilities are also accessible often in the county in which they live.22 Take
the case of Mallory.23 She is a white woman in Ohio and was married at
the time of her abortion.24 She had health insurance, which paid for her
abortion procedure in its entirety. She also lived within twenty minutes
of what she describes as “one of the best abortion facilities in the
country.”25 Women like Mallory and stories like hers that involve
abortion as a form of ordinary health care are less familiar.26 These
patients rarely show up in abortion rights cases and abortion rights
discourse. They have the abortion privilege.
This Article reveals the abortion privilege and contends that its
recognition and thoughtful incorporation into abortion rights law and
discourse could help redistribute the oppressive load women without the
same privilege carry and shore up the abortion right. Part I of this Article
provides an overview of abortion rights law and explains how its
evolution and the undue burden standard in particular have contributed
to entrenchment of the abortion privilege. Part II of this Article reveals
the abortion privilege and identifies the primary considerations that
support it. Although a purely privileged or unprivileged abortion

20. INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12.
21. See Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the
Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2093 (2021) [hereinafter Race-ing Roe]
(noting that the effect of abortion restrictions depends largely on a woman’s social
conditions and that laws like those that require waiting periods may have little impact on
a woman’s ability to obtain abortion care if she has resources like health insurance,
transportation, and childcare); INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12
(stating that twenty million women of reproductive age—or thirty-five percent—live in one
of the fourteen states supportive of abortion rights).
22. JONES ET AL., supra note 1, at 7, 17.
23. Mallory McMaster, Mallory McMaster’s Abortion Story, WE TESTIFY, https://
web.archive.org/web/20161009220511/http://wetestify.org/stories/mallorys-abortion-story/
(last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Professor Katie Watson writes in her book, Scarlet A: The Ethics, Law, and Politics
of Ordinary Abortion, that abortion is “ordinary” in that it is a routine medical procedure
and consistent with the practice of medicine—a patient requests a doctor bring her body
back to its natural or usual state, and the doctor uses a drug or procedure to do so. KATIE
WATSON, SCARLET A: THE ETHICS, LAW, AND POLITICS OF ORDINARY ABORTION 20–21
(2018). See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of how abortion has become common and
ordinary.
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experience is uncommon,27 as in other contexts examining privilege,
defining the contours of the privilege here is necessary to reveal it and
understand who has access to it.
Part III of this Article contends that, although the undue burden
standard is focused on harm as opposed to privilege, and part of
contemporary American life is the fact that society privileges some
groups over others, there are openings in abortion rights law and
discourse where the abortion privilege presses for recognition and
thoughtful incorporation. In this regard, revealing the abortion privilege
is intended to prompt privilege holders and other stakeholders to reflect
on what role privilege plays in the abortion experience and in
maintaining the precarious status quo of the abortion right. In addition,
revealing the abortion privilege is intended to start a dialogue about how
privilege holders and other stakeholders can help change the landscape
of abortion by working to understand the experience of those without the
abortion privilege and, importantly, by aligning with them in private and
public ways.
To this latter point, first, at a time when Roe v. Wade28 seems most
likely to be overturned,29 a crucial component to shoring up the legal right
is demonstrating widespread reliance on abortion, including by women
with the abortion privilege. Although “the rule of stare decisis is not an
‘inexorable command,’” the Court has expressed reluctance to overrule
precedent where, as here, those who have relied reasonably on the
continued application of a rule would experience hardship or inequity. 30
“Coming out” to demonstrate widespread reliance on abortion would also
help reduce the abortion stigma, which is both harmful to women and
makes demonstrating widespread reliance on abortion so difficult in the
first place.
27. Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence: Making
Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881, 898 (1995). The authors explain
that:
Most of us are privileged in some ways and not in others. A very poor person might
have been the oldest child in the family and exercised power over his siblings. The
wealthiest African-American woman, who could be a federal judge, might still have
racial, sexist epithets hurled at her as she walks down the street. The presence of
both the experience of privilege and the experience of subordination in different
aspects of our lives causes the experiences to be blurred, further hiding the
presence of privilege from our vocabulary and consciousness.
Id.
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. Donley et al., supra note 3.
30. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–56 (1992) (quoting
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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Second, women’s experience with abortion as a form of ordinary
health care has not emerged as part of the public narrative about
abortion, but there is power in harnessing that privileged experience. The
current abortion rights narrative plays to the undue burden standard to
reinforce how restricted abortion has become for many women. However,
as that narrative portrays women as victims while they attempt to
navigate the multitude of barriers to abortion care, it can inadvertently
undermine women and bolster the antiabortion strategy that suggests
abortion harms women and women need greater protection from
abortion. A narrative that includes abortion as a form of ordinary health
care would reinforce that women have the knowledge to decide the
outcome of their pregnancies without state intervention and demonstrate
that abortion can be, and is, like other medical procedures. It would also
help counteract the antiabortion strategy. Although not everyone is
willing to see abortion as ordinary health care today, they may be more
receptive to the idea in the future if we begin to tell that story.
Finally, as equality or equal rights re-emerges as a prominent theme
in legal and political arguments in support of the abortion right, to
advance the argument with integrity and to coalesce a base of support
around it, the abortion rights movement must first acknowledge and
reckon with the inequalities among women who make the abortion
decision. In other words, the abortion rights movement must recognize
oppression from the outside but also from within. The abortion privilege
framework is intended to help this process. As a start, abortion privilege
aptly describes how some women experience abortion and recognizes the
inequality among women who choose abortion. In addition, the abortion
privilege framework is designed to prompt efforts to equalize the abortion
experience while preempting the de-prioritization of women without the
same privilege. Finally, although there is risk in confronting any
privilege, the abortion privilege framework serves to show privilege
holders that maintaining the abortion privilege perpetuates unprivileged
women and privileged women’s inequality.
To be clear, this Article is not intended to criticize or vilify women
with the abortion privilege, call-out their experiences, or support any
notion that “checking” the abortion privilege is a simple matter,
especially given the contentious nature of abortion.31 Nor by focusing on
31. Loretta Ross, one of the founders of the reproductive justice movement, explains
that “call-out culture” can be counterproductive, and “calling in” can result in civil
conversations and learning opportunities. Jessica Bennett, What if Instead of Calling
People Out, We Called Them In?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/11/19/style/loretta-ross-smith-college-cancel-culture.html (“Calling out assumes the
worst. Calling in involves conversation, compassion and context.”); Michael Mascolo, The
Problem with “Check Your Privilege,” PSYCH. TODAY (Aug. 21, 2019), https://

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033863

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

8

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

FALL 2021

[Vol. 74:1

women with the abortion privilege is the Article suggesting that they
deserve attention or consideration at the expense of women without the
same privilege who increasingly face unjust barriers and unduly
burdensome restrictions to abortion care, often while existing at the
margins of society. Rather, the goal of this Article is to reveal the abortion
privilege, call-in privileged experiences, and demonstrate how
recognition and thoughtful incorporation of the abortion privilege could
help redistribute the oppressive load women without the abortion
privilege carry and shore up the abortion right.
II. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD AND ENTRENCHMENT OF THE
ABORTION PRIVILEGE
The law and legal narratives help shape every day public perception
and behavior and vice versa.32 Law certainly influences how we think and
talk about abortion, including who has abortions, what role abortion
plays in their lives and in society, and how much stigma is attached to
abortion.33 Although Roe v. Wade legalized abortion in the United
States, 34 Planned Parenthood v. Casey35 and its progeny have shaped
modern-day abortion rights jurisprudence and discourse. Specifically,
under the Court’s undue burden standard, abortion rights are won or lost
based on how burdensome abortion restrictions are for women. As one
might expect, women who must navigate these restrictions and limited
access to abortion care have become the central focus of the abortion
issue.36 Although this focus is both relevant and necessary as a legal
www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/values-matter/201908/the-problem-check-yourprivilege (discussing how people of privilege can experience the “privilege walk” with
enhanced awareness of their advantages when compared to others or by taking offense).
32. Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue-Burden Test After
Casey/Hellerstedt, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 421, 422 (2017) [hereinafter Liberty and the
Politics of Balance] (the Court responds to popular views about abortion); Anne Bloom &
Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort Litigation, 86 WASH. L.
REV. 709, 731 (2011) (legal narratives shape public perception and behavior).
33. See WATSON, supra note 26, at 39–78 (discussing how Roe, Casey, and Carhart tell
multiple stories about American abortion); Tracy A. Weitz & Katrina Kimport, The
Discursive Production of Abortion Stigma in the Texas Ultrasound Viewing Law, 30
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 6, 10–13, 20–21 (2015) (examining a Texas abortion
regulation and seven documents related to the law, including legal briefs challenging and
supporting it and the court’s decisions on the constitutionality of the law, and concluding
abortion stigma can be perpetuated through law).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
36. Sujatha Jesudason, Who Are the Heroes in Abortion Narratives and What Role Do
They Play in the Movement?, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 1, 3 (2015) (explaining
that the abortion narrative focuses on the most vulnerable and victimized women, including
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matter, the focus has entrenched the abortion privilege and obscured how
some women can and do have abortions as a form of ordinary health
care.37
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided the seminal abortion rights case
Roe v. Wade and struck down a Texas law criminalizing abortion through
all stages of pregnancy, except when a woman’s life was in danger.38 The
Court held that the right to privacy found in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s liberty clause is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision to terminate a pre-viable pregnancy.39 The Court made clear
that “[t]he detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent.”40
The Court established a trimester framework to determine the
constitutionality of restrictions on abortion.41 During the first trimester,
a woman and her attending physician could make the abortion decision
without state interference.42 During the second trimester, the state could
regulate abortion but only in ways reasonably related to maternal
health.43 Finally, after the fetus attained viability, the state could
regulate, and even prohibit, abortion, except when necessary to preserve
the life or health of the woman.44 Under the Roe trimester framework,
the constitutional inquiry focused on the substantive law as much as its
timing—whether the law at issue regulated abortion during the first
trimester, the second trimester, or after viability.45
In 1992, the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey
reaffirmed Roe’s central holding that the right to privacy is broad enough
to encompass the abortion decision before viability but upheld most parts
women of color, poor women, women who are victims of rape and incest, and women who
receive fetal anomaly diagnoses, and on the extreme hardship and powerlessness they
experience when confronting restrictions on abortion).
37. To be sure, Roe itself assumed a level of privilege. In recognizing a woman’s right
to decide whether to have an abortion in consultation with her doctor, Roe assumed women
had access to medical providers to consult with and that women had a “choice,” despite the
social conditions they faced—including racial and gender injustice, financial insecurity, and
lack of affordable childcare. Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2049–50.
38. 410 U.S. at 164.
39. Id. at 164, 153.
40. Id. at 153.
41. Id. at 163–65.
42. Id. at 163–64.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 163–65.
45. Id. Roe permitted virtually no regulations of the abortion decision in the first
trimester and permitted no regulations to protect potential life in the second trimester.
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872, 876 (1992) (reasoning that the
trimester framework prohibited any abortion regulations designed to advance state
interests in protecting potential life before viability).
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of a Pennsylvania law restricting access to abortion in the state.46 The
Court did away with the trimester framework because, in the plurality’s
view, it undervalued the state’s legitimate interest in potential life
throughout pregnancy.47 Instead of the trimester framework, the Court
adopted the undue burden standard.48 An undue burden exists, and
therefore a provision of law is invalid, if it has “the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus.”49 Under Casey’s undue burden standard, instead of
the relevant constitutional inquiry focusing as much on the timing of the
law, the inquiry shifted to the real-world impact the law has on women
obtaining abortions.50
Although the Roe trimester framework provided much greater legal
protection for the abortion right,51 the undue burden standard forces
courts to examine how abortion restrictions that stop short of banning
abortion actually affect women who seek abortion care.52 In this regard,
the undue burden standard contextualizes the burdens women face when
seeking abortion care.53 Without question, the undue burden standard
has been helpful in directing the Court’s attention to the limited access
46. Id. at 845–46, 879–901 (upholding Pennsylvania’s law related to informed consent
and a 24-hour waiting period, parental involvement, certain recordkeeping and reporting
requirements, but striking down Pennsylvania’s spousal notification requirement).
47. Id. at 873, 876.
48. Id. at 876.
49. Id. at 877. In applying the undue burden standard to a Pennsylvania law, the Court
held that a spousal notification requirement constituted an undue burden because it was
tantamount to an improper veto, and a woman’s husband could prevent her from obtaining
an abortion by using “physical force or psychological pressure or economic coercion” against
her. Id. at 897. At the same time, the Court held that a 24-hour waiting period before a
woman could obtain an abortion did not constitute an undue burden even if it would
increase the cost of abortion, risk delaying the procedure, or be particularly burdensome on
some women. Id. at 885–87. The Court explained that “[w]hether a burden falls on a
particular group is a distinct inquiry from whether [the law] is a substantial obstacle even
[for] the women in that group.” Id. at 887.
50. Id. at 894 (explaining that the undue burden analysis does not end with, but rather
begins with, the women “for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law
is irrelevant”).
51. Paula Abrams, The Scarlet Letter: The Supreme Court and the Language of Abortion
Stigma, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 293, 325 (2013) [hereinafter The Scarlet Letter] (noting
that applying strict scrutiny substantially protected women’s decision-making authority up
until viability).
52. See id. at 322 (comparing the Roe narrative presenting the woman as a passive
recipient of medical judgment and the Casey narrative as more woman-focused even though
the undue burden standard is less protective of the abortion right).
53. Joel Dodge, “We Must Not Blind Ourselves”: The Supreme Court & Abortion Access
for Women Living in Poverty, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 4 (Oct. 2019), https://www.acslaw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2001/10/Abortion-Access-Dodge-IB-Final.pdf; Liberty and the Politics of
Balance, supra note 32, at 437.
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to abortion care in this country and the perils it poses. Most recently, in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and June Medical Services v. Russo,
the Court struck down targeted regulations of abortion providers in
Texas and Louisiana based on the drastic impact these laws would have
on women’s access to abortion in those states.54
To be sure, abortion rights law and discourse should interrogate how
abortion restrictions impose substantial barriers on the most vulnerable
women seeking abortion care. As a matter of law, abortion restrictions
are most relevant for them, and as a matter of fact, they are most likely
to seek and obtain abortion care.55 They are also underrepresented in
state and federal government.56 In other words, abortion restrictions hit
hardest against them.57
However, as abortion rights law and discourse focus on women who
must navigate abortion restrictions and limited access to abortion care,
women who experience abortion under different circumstances, that is,
women who experience abortion as a form of ordinary health care, are
not reflected in the abortion narrative inside or outside of the
courtroom.58 Given that abortion was catapulted from the health care
domain to the social, legal, and political domains long ago,59 their
54. In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court invalidated a Texas admitting privileges law
that would have forced half of the state’s abortion facilities to close (40 to 20), and the state’s
ambulatory surgical law that would have further decreased the number of abortion facilities
in the state to seven or eight facilities. 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312, 2316 (2016). The Court noted
that such closures would result in “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and increased
crowding.” Id. at 2313. Similarly, in June Medical Services, the Court invalidated a
Louisiana admitting privileges law that would have forced two of the three remaining
abortion facilities in the state to close, leaving Louisiana with one facility and making it
unduly burdensome or impossible for women to obtain an abortion, particularly poor
women. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2129–30 (2020). In applying the undue burden standard, the lower
federal courts have also examined how the laws at issue affect waiting times, crowding,
travel time, childcare expenses, and missed work and pay. Dodge, supra note 53, at 2–3, 7.
State courts have taken a similar approach. Id. at 7, 10.
55. Women electing abortion care are disproportionately women of color and lowincome. See INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12.
56. See Kevin Uhrmacher et al., Harris is the Pick, but Women of Color Remain
Underrepresented in Government, WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2020), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/08/11/women-of-color-representation-government/.
57. Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2093 (“And because race and socioeconomic status
are often related — particularly in those regions of the country where abortion restrictions
are more extensive — the burden on poor women will also result in a burden on women of
color, rendering abortion inaccessible to these groups.”).
58. In June Medical Services, Justice Gorsuch in dissent speculated about such women.
140 S. Ct. at 2176 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Suppose that for a substantial number of
women Louisiana’s law imposes no burden at all. These women might live in an area wellserved by well-qualified abortion providers who can easily obtain admitting privileges.”).
59. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 2 (“[P]olitics drives abortion access in the United States.”);
id. at 3 (“Since Roe v. Wade, abortion has dominated our political discussions in the United
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experience with abortion as a form of ordinary health care is a privileged
one and one worthy of a critical dialogue.
III. REVEALING THE ABORTION PRIVILEGE
In the abortion context, privilege is not an entirely new concept,
particularly in discussions about how women managed unintended
pregnancies before Roe and how women would manage them if the Court
were to overturn Roe. Women with access to financial and health care
resources would find ways to access abortion care while women without
such access would struggle and could be forced to self-manage their
abortion or carry unwanted pregnancies to term.60 Under unlawful
circumstances, it is easier to recognize privilege, but the abortion
privilege exists even under lawful circumstances. In fact, legal abortion
may mask privilege because it gives rise to a presumption of access to it.
This section reveals the abortion privilege as it exists today and
highlights the benefits it confers on people who possess it. As made clear
in other privilege contexts, we must reveal privilege before we can begin
to examine it or begin to address it to improve the status quo.61
States.”); id. at 32–33 (“She read two years’ worth of articles that mentioned the word
‘abortion’ in the Washington Post, New York Times, and Associates Press. . . . There are a
lot of them—on average, one a day. . . . [M]ost articles merely mentioned the topic of
abortion, usually as an example of a hot political issue.”); DAVID S. COHEN & CAROLE JOFFE,
OBSTACLE COURSE: THE EVERYDAY STRUGGLE TO GET AN ABORTION IN AMERICA 9 (2020)
(“Political attempts to interfere with abortion have been a constant in American political
life since Roe.”); Aziza Ahmed, June Medical: Reason or Politics?, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS
NETWORK (June 30, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/human_rights/2020/06/junemedical-reason-or-politics.html.
60. Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2046 (“Wealthy, well-connected women could
circumvent the law either by leaving the country to seek legal abortion care, or finding
a psychiatrist who could attest to the woman’s likely suicide if leave for a ‘therapeutic’
abortion was not granted. Those without the financial wherewithal to do so were left with
the prospect of continuing a pregnancy or risking their lives in a ‘back-alley’ abortion.”);
RACHEL BENSON GOLD, THE GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y, LESSONS FROM BEFORE ROE:
WILL PAST BE PROLOGUE? 8, 10 (2003), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/
article_files/gr060108.pdf; Mark A. Graber, The Ghost of Abortion Past: Pre-Roe Abortion
Law in Action, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 309, 311, 376 (1994) (explaining that affluent women
with professional or personal relationships with private physicians rarely encountered
substantial obstacles to abortion care and that if Roe is overturned restrictions on abortion
would “reproduce many of the worst features of the system of abortion regulation in place
in the years before Roe”); see generally MARY ZIEGLER, ABORTION AND THE LAW IN AMERICA:
ROE V. WADE TO THE PRESENT 29–30 (2020) [hereinafter ABORTION AND THE LAW]; LESLIE J.
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1867–1973, at 16 (1997).
61. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA 8 (1996) (“Privilege is invisible only until looked for, but silence in
the face of privilege sustains its invisibility.”); Wildman & Davis, supra note 27, at 885.
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By way of background, privilege is often discussed in the context of
commonly recognized social orderings.62 For example, privilege exists
between whites and people of color and between men and women.63 It
also exists between heterosexuals and the LGBTQ+ community and
between people who are able-bodied and people with disabilities.64
Privilege is not limited to these commonly recognized social orderings,
however. In Privilege Revealed, Professor Stephanie Wildman explains
that privilege exists in relation to societal norms.65 For privileged group
members, their characteristics and attributes establish the societal
norms or what is normal in society.66 For unprivileged group members,
their characteristics and attributes are judged against those norms.67
Professor Wildman uses her experience as a juror for an example of
when she experienced being a member of a privileged group and a
member of an unprivileged group.68 On the one hand, she experienced
being in a privileged group during voir dire.69 She observed the defense
attorney in the case ask each prospective juror who looked Asian if he
spoke English.70 The attorney did not ask Professor Wildman or anyone
else the same question.71 Although she considered saying, “I’m Stephanie
Wildman, I’m a professor of law, and yes, I speak English,” she
acknowledges that she exercised her privilege with silence.72
On the other hand, Professor Wildman experienced being in an
unprivileged group when it came to the juror schedule because she is a
parent.73 The court expected all jurors to serve until 5:00 p.m. She needed
to pick up her children after school at 2:40 p.m. and bring them to their
various after-school activities.74 The courtroom norm was not designed to
meet her needs; she was part of an unprivileged group and had to
“conform to the norm.”75
There are two core elements of privilege:

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

WILDMAN, supra note 61, at 95.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14–16.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
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First, the characteristics of the privileged group define the
societal norm, often benefiting those in the privileged group.
Second, privileged group members can rely on their privilege and
avoid objecting to oppression. Both the conflation of privilege
with the societal norm and the implicit option to ignore
oppression mean that privilege is rarely seen by the holder of the
privilege.76
In the United States, mothers and women who do not have an
abortion define the societal norm or what society expects from women
with respect to abortion. As noted above, although “one in four U.S.
women will have an abortion in their lifetime,”77 statistically speaking,
most women will not have one. Moreover, and equally important in
defining the societal norm, abortion is heavily stigmatized or marked by
disgrace or disapproval. As a result, in the United States, most
Americans share a common and significantly underestimated belief
about abortion—that it is rare.78
For purposes of this Article, I focus primarily on women who have
had abortions and the privileged and unprivileged members within that
group. First, to be sure, privileged group members have had an abortion,
but their experience with abortion is as a form of ordinary health care.
In addition, they are not reflected in abortion rights cases or abortion
rights discourse, and they can more readily avoid suffering from the
public stigma, shame, and oppression associated with abortion and being
outside of the societal norm.79 For example, as discussed below,
privileged group members are able to avoid abortion restrictions, such as
a mandatory waiting period, and have the advantage of not having to
suffer through the indignity of the state second-guessing their decision
and their ability to make their own health care decisions.
Second, privileged group members can rely on their privileged
experience to avoid objecting to the oppression associated with abortion.
Privileged group members can afford to be silent about restrictions on
abortion access because they are simply not relevant for them or are not
76. Id. at 13–14; Wildman & Davis, supra note 27, at 883 (“Rather than describing
privilege as something bestowed upon us specially, privilege appears as the fabric of life, as
the way things are.”).
77. JONES ET AL., supra note 1, at 3.
78. Paula Abrams, The Bad Mother: Stigma, Abortion and Surrogacy, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 179, 183 (2015) [hereinafter The Bad Mother] (strong moral disapproval of abortion
is influenced by the lack of public awareness about how common abortion is); see also Sarah
Kliff, We Polled 1,060 Americans About Abortion. This Is What They Got Wrong., VOX (Feb.
29, 2016), https://www.vox.com/a/abortion-statistics-opinions-2016/poll.
79. See WILDMAN, supra note 61, at 14 (“The privileged characteristic is the norm; those
who stand outside are the aberrant or ‘alternative.’”).
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unduly burdensome for them. In fact, under the undue burden standard,
privileged group member experiences with abortion could undermine the
argument that a restriction constitutes a substantial obstacle, even
though that analysis ostensibly requires focus on women for whom the
restriction is relevant. In this regard, privileged group members can
afford to be silent and may even think it is prudent to be silent.
Of course, to simply conclude that all privileged group members
receive advantages by virtue of their experience with abortion as a form
of ordinary health care and all unprivileged members do not would
oversimply the matter. As tempting as it might be to take a categorical
approach to the abortion privilege, most women will not experience
abortion as a purely privileged or unprivileged event.80 One aspect of the
abortion privilege can intersect with an aspect of subordination or
additional privilege, giving a woman more or less access to the privilege. 81
For example, as noted above, abortion is heavily stigmatized in the
United States. One could imagine a scenario where some privileged group
members experience a heightened form of the abortion stigma because
they are the same group members who have reproductive privilege more
broadly. That is, in addition to having access to abortion, they have access
to sex education, contraception, family planning resources, and other
forms of reproductive health care. Yet, they are facing an unintended
pregnancy. The irony is some privileged group members may experience
a heightened form of stigma because they had access to an even greater
or comprehensive reproductive privilege. With a heightened form of
stigma (or any stigma), some privileged group members may not think
that they carry a privilege at all with respect to abortion.
However, just as Professor Khiara M. Bridges and other racial justice
scholars have recognized that “different groups of white people have
different access to white privilege”82 and in some instances white
privilege can act as a “double-edged sword,”83 here too, women with the
80. See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59,
at 12 (“There are different abortion paths in different parts of the country based on
individual clinic practice and particular state and local laws, with some people facing many
of the barriers . . . and others facing none.”); Aspen Baker & Carolina De Robertis, ProVoice: A Vision for the Future, 36 OFF OUR BACKS 33, 36 (2006) (“Each facet of a person’s
background can affect their truth, their relationship with the world and their experience
with abortion.”).
81. See Khiara M. Bridges, White Privilege & White Disadvantage, 105 VA. L. REV. 449,
458–59 (2019) [hereinafter White Privilege]; see generally Khiara M. Bridges, Race,
Pregnancy, and the Opioid Epidemic: White Privilege and the Criminalization of Opioid Use
During Pregnancy, 133 HARV. L. REV. 770 passim (2020).
82. White Privilege, supra note 81, at 458.
83. Id. at 468 (emphasis omitted). In the context of white privilege, Professor Bridges
explains that not all white people have access to white privilege in the same way. Id. at
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abortion privilege may have different access to the advantages it confers.
That privileged group members may not have complete access to the
privilege or that privilege does not always work as an advantage, does
not mean the privilege does not exist. Rather, the take-away should be
that privilege in this context is worth revealing for the benefit of both
privileged and unprivileged group members because privilege can work
against both groups.84
Here, I reveal the abortion privilege by examining the abortion
experience (or the process of obtaining the abortion) and the public
stigma, shame, and oppression associated with abortion.85 As reflected
by Maleeha and Mallory’s stories at the outset of this Article, there is no
uniform abortion experience.86 Every woman’s abortion experience is
unique, and a multitude of factors influence her experience, some of them
in her control and others not.87 In the same way women experience
obstacles to abortion care differently, women experience privilege with

458. Professor Bridges uses the example of Carrie Buck, the plaintiff in the Supreme Court
case Buck v. Bell, to demonstrate how white privilege may come with disadvantages. Id. at
468. In Buck’s case, white privilege gave her access to the Virginia State Colony for
Epileptics and Feebleminded, which was designed to care for vulnerable people when family
could not. Id. at 453. Had Buck not been white, the institution would not have been open to
her. Id. at 474–75. In addition, white privilege gave Buck membership to the race that
people in power believed was superior. Id. at 468. However, Buck’s whiteness also made
her a target of eugenicists because they were always concerned with advancing the white
race, and placed her in the path of being forcibly sterilized. Id. at 464, 468. Professor Bridges
concludes that white privilege can act as a double-edged sword, making privilege dangerous
for people with it and without it, and therefore, we all should strive to dismantle it. Id. at
482.
84. See id. at 480–82; see also infra Part IV.C for a discussion of how the abortion
privilege perpetuates privileged women’s inequality.
85. See WILDMAN, supra note 61, at 146 (“We must make visible the systems of privilege
that exclude, and we must examine the role of the rule of law in maintaining those
systems.”); FOSTER, supra note 5, at 63 (“Access to abortion depends on when you discover
you are pregnant, how much money you have, and, critically, where you live.”).
86. See supra notes 14 and 23.
87. See MEERA SHAH, YOU’RE THE ONLY ONE I’VE TOLD: THE STORIES BEHIND ABORTION
8, 22 (2020); see generally FOSTER, supra note 5, at 63; Lindy West, Foreword to SHOUT
YOUR ABORTION ix (Amelia Bonow & Emily Nokes eds., 2018). As Dr. Jennifer Gunter
explained when writing about abortion and empathy, one patient could live in New York
and have money and a pro-choice mother. Jennifer Gunter, Dear Lena Dunham: Check Your
Abortion Privilege, KEVINMD (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2017/01/dearlena-dunham-check-abortion-privilege.html. She could have easy access to abortion care
and have the abortion procedure done by eight weeks of pregnancy. Id. Meanwhile, another
woman in Alabama could spend weeks searching the internet to find a provider and may
need to work additional shifts to pay for her abortion. Id. At the same time, another woman
may be a rape survivor or face a pregnancy with fetal anomalies while another woman may
be in a domestic violence situation. Id.
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respect to abortion care differently.88 In light of how unique a woman’s
abortion experience is, my goal is not to rigidly define the abortion
privilege so much as it is to reveal the most dominant aspects of the
privilege and highlight the benefits it confers.89
Funds for Abortion. Having funds for the abortion—whether
private, public, or out-of-pocket—is central to the abortion privilege.90
The most common reason women in America choose to have an abortion
is because they cannot afford to raise a/another child, yet the primary
substantial obstacle that women face when obtaining an abortion is
financial.91 Although abortion costs vary depending on the timing and
type of abortion procedure and the facility, the median cost of a first
trimester abortion is $500.00.92 An abortion after fourteen weeks but
before twenty weeks costs on average $750.00, and after twenty weeks,
88. See LORETTA J. ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN
INTRODUCTION 72 (2017) (“[R]eproductive justice does not insist that one set of meanings
or experiences describes the experiences of all people.”). To define abortion privilege rigidly
is to fall into a monolithic or essentialist trap. See id.; see also Wildman & Davis, supra note
27, at 898–99 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (“The Koosh ball
. . . ‘highlights that each person is embedded in a matrix of . . . [categories] that interact in
different contexts’ taking different shapes. In some contexts we are privileged and in some
subordinated, and these contexts interact.”); Lisa R. Pruitt & Marta R. Vanegas,
Urbanormativity, Spatial Privilege, and Judicial Blind Spots in Abortion Law, 30
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 76, 81 (2015) (“[A]bortion restrictions have enormously
different consequences not only from person to person, but also from place to place.”).
89. See Wildman & Davis, supra note 27, at 899–900.
90. In 2014, slightly more than half of abortion patients used out-of-pocket funds for
their procedure. See INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12.
91. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 65 (“Among the primary obstacles people seeking abortions
face—the cost of the procedure, the difficulty of getting to the nearest provider, the prospect
of onerous abortion restrictions, the fear of stigma in their community, and the presence of
protesters at the site itself—the most substantial is financial.”). In the Turnaway Study,
whose participants closely resembled women who obtain abortions nationally, half of the
women were living in poverty. Id. at 19–20. About a quarter of the women who were
economically privileged and middle-class or wealthier reported having private health
insurance and stated, “they often or always ha[d] enough money.” Id. at 20; Amanda
Gelman et al., Abortion Stigma Among Low-Income Women Obtaining Abortions in Western
Pennsylvania: A Qualitative Assessment, 49 PERSPS. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 29, 30
(2017) (“Low-income women are more likely than those who are economically better off to
encounter difficulties in accessing timely and safe abortion services, and appear to often
rely on social support to mitigate barriers to abortion access.”); see also WILDMAN, supra
note 61, at 11 (“The economic power system is not invisible—everyone knows that money
brings privilege. But the myth persists that all have access to that power through individual
resourcefulness. This myth of potential economic equality supports the invisibility of the
other power systems that prevent fulfillment of that ideal.”).
92. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 65; Alina Salganicoff et al., Coverage for Abortion Services
in Medicaid, Marketplace Plans, and Private Plans, KFF (June 24, 2019), https://
www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-in-medicaidmarketplace-plans-and-private-plans/.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4033863

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

18

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

FALL 2021

[Vol. 74:1

the cost is $1,750.00.93 These costs do not include any necessary
transportation, lodging, child care costs, or lost wages from time off of
work.94
The cost of an abortion is particularly burdensome for low-income
women, some of whom have to delay the abortion to raise funds for it.95
Since 1977, the Hyde Amendment has prohibited the use of federal
funding to pay for abortion, with limited exceptions.96 The Supreme
Court has upheld state and federal restrictions on abortion funding and
has concluded that such funding is not part and parcel of the
constitutional right to abortion.97 In addition, state and federal
regulations and insurance policies increasingly limit the availability of
private insurance and state Medicaid funding for abortion care.98 In
eleven states, women have no coverage options for abortion under
Medicaid, private insurance, or Marketplace plans.99
Access to Abortion Facilities. Having access to abortion care
facilities and not needing to travel great distances for abortion care is
part of the abortion privilege. The number of abortion facilities available
to women has drastically declined from 2,700 in the early 1980s to around
800 now.100 In two states, 90% of women live in a county without an
abortion care facility—Mississippi and Wyoming.101 In contrast, in five
states, 90% of women live in a county with one or more abortion care
facilities—California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Nevada, and New York.102
Women having to travel longer distances to an abortion care facility
experience increased out-of-pocket costs, negative mental health

93. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 65.
94. Id. at 66.
95. Id. at 65 (“Needing time to raise money to cover travel and procedure costs was the
most common reason for delay among our study participants, with nearly two-thirds of
women who showed up close to the clinic’s gestational limit reporting such costs as a reason
for delay.”); Salganicoff et al., supra note 92.
96. Salganicoff et al., supra note 92.
97. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
98. See Salganicoff et al., supra note 92. About fifteen states provide state funds to cover
abortions for women on Medicaid. Id.; INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 12.
99. Salganicoff et al., supra note 92.
100. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 277.
101. JONES ET AL., supra note 1, at 8; see also Pruitt & Vanegas, supra note 88, at 82
(arguing that the burdensome impact of an abortion regulation increases in proportion to
the distance a woman must travel, which in turn can be exacerbated by other factors, such
as if she is a low-income woman, has an inflexible work schedule, and/or lacks childcare if
she already has children).
102. JONES ET AL., supra note 1, at 8.
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outcomes, delayed care, and decreased use of abortion care services.103
According to one recent study, close to 20%—or 155,000 women—had to
travel fifty miles or more for abortion care in 2014; the main reason
women chose their facilities was because the provider was the closest to
them.104
Restrictions on Abortion Care. Being able to obtain an abortion
in a state where the right is unrestricted is part of the abortion privilege.
In 2019, fourteen states were considered supportive of abortion rights;
35% of women (twenty-four million women) live in these states.105 In
contrast, twenty-nine states were considered hostile to abortion rights;
approximately 58% of women (forty million women) live in these
states. 106 For women who encounter abortion restrictions in their states,
these laws not only make abortion more costly and time-consuming, but
they also impose the state’s moral disapproval and shame on women and
perpetuate the abortion stigma.107
Abortion restrictions typically come in two forms. The first type of
restriction includes fetal personhood laws, including laws based on
purported fetal pain and laws that elevate a fetus to a child.108 They are
designed to equate abortion and infanticide and are based on stereotypes
about women as mothers because “what kind of woman would ‘kill’ her
‘child’?”109 The second type of restriction includes women protective-type
laws, including “informed consent” laws, required waiting periods,
mandatory ultrasounds, and targeted regulations of providers, such as

103. Liza Fuentes & Jenna Jerman, Distance Traveled to Obtain Clinical Abortion Care
in the United States and Reasons for Clinic Choice, 28 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 1623, 1623–24
(2019).
104. Id. at 1629. In the Turnaway Study, one quarter of the women (23%) had to travel
more than 100 miles to obtain their abortion. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 71–72. In 2014, 65%
of women traveled twenty-five miles or less to obtain abortion care, 17% traveled between
twenty-five and forty-nine miles, 10% traveled fifty to one hundred miles, and 8% traveled
more than one hundred miles. INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12.
105. INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12.
106. Id.
107. See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 8 (explaining how abortion restrictions
represent “abortion exceptionalism: the idea that abortion is treated uniquely compared to
other medical procedures that are comparable to abortion in complexity and safety”);
Natasha Mehta et al., The Association Between Reproductive Autonomy and Abortion
Stigma Among Women Who Have Had Abortions in the United States, 4 STIGMA & HEALTH
377, 380 (2019) (if a woman has more reproductive autonomy, she is less likely to experience
abortion stigma); Paula Abrams, Abortion Stigma: The Legacy of Casey, 35 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. REP. 299, 300, 302 (2014) [hereinafter Abortion Stigma]; Alison Norris et al., Abortion
Stigma: A Reconceptualization of Constituents, Causes, and Consequences, 21 WOMEN’S
HEALTH ISSUES (SPECIAL ISSUE) S49, S51 (2011).
108. See Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 318.
109. See id.
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admitting privileges laws.110 They are based on the premise that women
who seek an abortion have made a wrong decision or need protection from
abortion, and they raise questions about women’s autonomy and
judgment.111 These laws can make women question their moral
authority.112
Stigma. Living in a region and community where abortion is less
stigmatized and having supportive partners, families, and social
networks is part of the abortion privilege. Abortion stigma is defined as
a “negative attribute ascribed to women who seek to terminate a
pregnancy that marks them, internally or externally, as inferior to ideals
of womanhood.”113 Stigma affects a woman’s physical and mental
well-being and influences her decision-making and behavior around
disclosure of her abortion.114 Stigma can also lead to conflicts in her
relationships with her partner, family, and friends.115
Regional attitudes about abortion strongly influence how a woman
experiences abortion stigma. According to one study, women who live in
the South and Midwest, where abortion care is limited and antiabortion
activities—protests, antiabortion billboards, and harassment of women
at clinics—are more common, are more likely to perceive abortion stigma
than women who live in the Northeast.116 In addition, although the West
is seen as a progressive area of the country, women from states like
Colorado, Idaho, Utah, and Wyoming where there is poor abortion access
and states withhold Medicaid funding, also are more likely to perceive
abortion stigma compared to women in the Northeast. 117
Community attitudes also influence how a woman experiences
abortion stigma. When women encounter negative attitudes about
abortion from their partners, families, and social networks, including
that abortion is morally reprehensible, a form of rejection of motherhood,
and rare and therefore deviant, women experience “negative emotional,
110. Id. at 318–19.
111. Id.; see also FOSTER, supra note 5, at 141 (“Of course, the need for such decisionmaking help from the state is not rooted in evidence.”).
112. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 300, 302.
113. Id. at 305.
114. Kristen M. Shellenberg & Amy O. Tsui, Correlates of Perceived and Internalized
Stigma Among Abortion Patients in the USA: An Exploration by Race and Hispanic
Ethnicity, 118 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS S152, S152 (2012).
115. Id.
116. COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 8–9 (New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Maine—as well as Illinois and Nevada—recently passed laws to protect the abortion right
in the event that the Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade); Shellenberg & Tsui, supra
note 114, at S155–56; see also Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 316.
117. See Shellenberg & Tsui, supra note 114, at S155–57; see also Abortion Stigma,
supra note 107, at 316.
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physical, financial[,] and social consequences.”118 Some women respond
to abortion stigma by perpetuating the stigma—by concealing their
abortions or distinguishing their abortion from other women’s abortions
as “acceptable.”119
Race. Being white is part of the abortion privilege. Abortion is closely
connected with race. Three in five women who seek abortion care are
women of color,120 and African American women in particular have
disproportionately high abortion rates.121 As Professor Bridges explains,
African American women’s abortion rate should not be understood as
simple exercises in autonomy or agency but rather “as a symptom of their
vulnerability and marginalization.”122 In addition to facing violence in
multiple forms, African American communities across the country are
suffering from poverty, lack of health care coverage and access to
contraception, and inadequate sex education in schools.123 In this regard,
although abortion is health care African American women elect, they also
need and use abortion to manage the profoundly constrained social
conditions they face as a result of structural racism.124
Abortion Alternatives. Being able to experience a healthy
pregnancy and childbirth is part of the abortion privilege. In most
instances, the alternative to abortion is childbirth. The United States
maternal mortality rate is the highest of any developed country.125 In

118. Gelman et al., supra note 91, at 2, 7.
119. Id. at 2. Professor Katie Watson explains that when women do not want to identify
with other women who have had an abortion, that desire may be a product of stigma.
WATSON, supra note 26, at 29. In these cases of “us” versus “them,” rather than trying to
understand the “them,” some women work overtime to remain on the “us” side. Id.
120. COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 13. In terms of percentages, white women
accounted for 39% of abortions, Black women accounted for 28% of them, Hispanic women
accounted for 25% of them, and other races accounted for 9% of abortions. Id.; see also
INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12.
121. Susan A. Cohen, Abortion and Women of Color: The Bigger Picture, 11 GUTTMACHER
POL’Y REV. 2, 2 (2008).
122. Khiara M. Bridges, Beyond Torts: Reproductive Wrongs and the State, 121 COLUM.
L. REV. 1017, 1044–51 (2021) [hereinafter Reproductive Wrongs and the State].
123. Id. at 1044–45.
124. Id. at 1051; see also Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2090–91 (“As reproductive
justice advocates make clear, for many people of color, the decision to terminate a pregnancy
is shot through with concerns about economic and financial insecurity, limited employment
options, diminution of educational opportunities and lack of access to health care and
affordable quality childcare.”); April Shaw, Note, How Race-Selective and Sex-Selective
Bans on Abortion Expose the Color-Coded Dimensions of the Right to Abortion and
Deficiencies in Constitutional Protections for Women of Color, 40 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 545, 547–48 (2016) (arguing that Casey’s “undue burden test inevitably ignores
how abortion laws more harshly regulate women of color”).
125. COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 18.
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2018, there were 658 maternal deaths in the United States. 126 The
number of pregnancy-related deaths has “steadily increased from 7.2
deaths per 100,000 live births in 1987 to 17.3 deaths per 100,000 live
births in 2017.”127 There are significant racial and ethnic disparities in
pregnancy-related deaths.128 For example, African American women’s
pregnancy mortality ratio was 41.7 deaths per 100,000 live births.129 In
contrast, white women’s pregnancy mortality ratio was 13.4 per 100,000
live births.130
In the Turnaway Study, the first study to rigorously examine the
effects of abortion by comparing women who had an abortion with women
who were denied a wanted abortion, two women died—both were in the
group who were denied a wanted abortion.131 One woman died days after
giving birth from an infection that is rarely fatal, except in connection
with pregnancy, and a second woman died as a result of eclampsia
post-childbirth.132 Abortion is one of the safest medical procedures;
continuing a pregnancy and giving birth are far riskier.133 Being able to
choose an abortion alternative is part of the abortion privilege, too.
In short, the abortion privilege can be more or less accessible and its
benefits enhanced or diminished by the availability of private insurance
or public funding, the number of abortion facilities in a woman’s county,
the number of restrictions on abortion in a state, sociodemographic and
situational variables that affect whether a woman feels stigmatized or
supported in her decision, a woman’s race, and whether a healthy
pregnancy and childbirth are a readily available alternative to abortion.
Although these considerations are not an exhaustive list, they can
heavily influence whether a woman experiences abortion as a form
ordinary health care or as an event associated with oppression. This
range in experience exists even though abortion is legal.

126. Gaby Galvin, The U.S. Has a Maternal Mortality Rate Again. Here’s Why That
Matters., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.usnews.com/news/
healthiest-communities/articles/2020-01-30/why-the-new-us-maternal-mortality-rate-isimportant.
127. Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/reproductive
health/maternal-mortality/pregnancy-mortality-surveillance-system.htm (last visited Oct.
19, 2021).
128. See generally Khiara M. Bridges, Racial Disparities in Maternal Mortality, 95
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229 (2020).
129. Pregnancy Mortality Surveillance System, supra note 127.
130. Id.
131. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 6, 149–50.
132. Id. There were no abortion-related deaths in the study. Id. at 150.
133. See id. at 142–43.
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IV. PRESSING FOR RECOGNITION AND INCORPORATION OF THE
ABORTION PRIVILEGE
Due to the undue burden standard’s focus on harm, the abortion
stigma, and the abortion privilege, women with the abortion privilege
and their experience with abortion rarely show up in abortion rights
cases and abortion rights discourse. Revealing the abortion privilege here
was not an end in and of itself. Rather, revealing the abortion privilege
is intended to alert privilege holders and other stakeholders to the
privilege and prompt reflection about the role the abortion privilege plays
in the abortion experience and in maintaining the precarious status of
the abortion right. Moreover, revealing the abortion privilege is intended
to start a dialogue about openings in abortion rights law and discourse
where recognition and thoughtful incorporation of the abortion privilege
experience could help redistribute the oppressive load women without
the abortion privilege carry and shore up the abortion right.
In Part A of this section, I discuss how demonstrating widespread
reliance on abortion, including by women with the abortion privilege, is
crucial to the stare decisis argument to uphold Roe. In addition,
demonstrating widespread reliance on abortion in the United States
would help reduce the abortion stigma, which is both harmful to women
and makes demonstrating widespread reliance on abortion so
challenging in the first place. In Part B of this section, I discuss how
women’s experiences with abortion as a form of ordinary health care
would enhance the existing public narrative about abortion by
demonstrating that abortion can be, and is, like other medical
procedures. It would also help counteract the antiabortion strategy that
suggests abortion harms women, and women need greater protection
from abortion. Finally, in Part C of this section, I discuss the need for the
abortion rights movement to acknowledge and reckon with the
inequalities among women who choose abortion in order to advance an
equality argument in support of the abortion right. The abortion privilege
framework recognizes these inequalities among women, allows for
recognition and incorporation of privileged women’s experiences without
deprioritizing women without the same privilege, and helps crystallize
how maintaining the abortion privilege perpetuates unprivileged
women’s and privileged women’s inequality.
A. Demonstrating Widespread Reliance on Abortion and Reducing the
Abortion Stigma
Women with the abortion privilege or women who experience
abortion as a form of ordinary health care rarely show up in abortion
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rights cases and abortion rights discourse but not because they do not
exercise the abortion right. Although women of color and low-income
women disproportionately rely on abortion care, women who have
abortions are diverse in terms of “culture, age, socioeconomic status, faith
and spiritual beliefs, race, physical ability, [and] immigration
background.”134 At a time when Roe v. Wade seems most likely to be
overturned, demonstrating widespread reliance on abortion, including by
women with the abortion privilege, is crucial to the stare decisis
argument necessary to uphold Roe. In addition, demonstrating
widespread reliance on abortion would help reduce the abortion stigma,
which is both harmful to women and makes demonstrating widespread
reliance on abortion so challenging in the first place.
First, one of the cornerstones of the American legal system is the rule
of stare decisis, which means “to stand by what has been decided.”135 The
rule of stare decisis requires “that lower courts follow the decisions of
superior courts and that the United States Supreme Court defer to [its]
past decisions” if they involve the same or similar issues.136 If the
Supreme Court is going to overturn precedent, it may do so in accordance
with the rule of stare decisis if it has special reasons for doing so.137
Stare decisis discussions have become a recurring feature in the
Court’s abortion rights decisions, and it is a “chief impediment” to the
Court overturning Roe.138 In Casey, when many expected the Court to
overturn Roe, the Court penned a lengthy discussion about stare decisis
before it decided to retain Roe’s essential holding.139 In part, the Court
focused on whether people had relied on Roe in a way that would lead to
a special hardship and inequity if the Court overturned the decision.140
The Court concluded that Roe had engendered reliance interests and
explained that, “while the effect of reliance on Roe [could not] be exactly
measured, neither [could] the certain cost of overruling Roe for people
who have ordered their thinking and living around that case.”141 The
Court reasoned that:

134. Aspen Baker & Carolina De Robertis, Pro-Voice: A Vision for the Future, 36 OFF
OUR BACKS 33, 36 (2006); see also INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note
12.
135. Melissa Murray, The Symbiosis of Abortion and Precedent, 134 HARV. L. REV. 308,
309 (2020).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 309–10.
138. Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2029–30, 2072–75.
139. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–61 (1992).
140. Id. at 854.
141. Id. at 856.
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[P]eople have organized intimate relationships and made choices
that define their views of themselves and their places in society,
in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail. The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.142
In 2020, the Supreme Court in June Medical Services v. Russo reiterated
that reliance interests remain a critical component of the stare decisis
analysis.143
Demonstrating widespread reliance on the abortion right will be key
to asserting the legal argument that the Court should uphold Roe. As was
true in 1992 when the Court decided Casey, today, generations of
women—as well as their partners and families—rely on Roe’s right to
make decisions in their intimate relationships and in their participation
in economic and social life.144 In light of the existing abortion rights
narrative, it is not surprising that most Americans harbor under the false
perception that abortion is rare and takes place among women of a
certain race and socioeconomic status.145
However, as Professor Katie Watson writes in her book, Scarlet A:
The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Ordinary Abortion, abortion in America
is both common and ordinary.146 As noted above, about one in four women
will have an abortion during their lifetime.147 In fact, since Roe v. Wade,
142. Id.
143. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2171 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“The presence or absence of reliance is often a critical factor in applying the
doctrine of stare decisis.”); see generally Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent,
47 GA. L. REV. 1035 (2013) (arguing that reliance should be a court’s primary factor in
deciding whether and when it will adhere to precedent); Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and
Reliance, 62 EMORY L.J. 1459 (2013) (arguing that courts should move away from
“backward-looking reliance” to forward-looking interests to manage adjudicative changes
for society).
144. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
145. See WATSON, supra note 26, at 19; The Bad Mother, supra note 78, at 183; Abortion
Stigma, supra note 107, at 300, 315; Palma Joy Strand, The Civic Underpinnings of Legal
Change: Gay Rights, Abortion, and Gun Control, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 117, 128–29
(2011).
146. WATSON, supra note 26, at 19–20.
147. JONES ET AL., supra note 1; WATSON, supra note 26, at 34. On average, women in
the U.S. want two children, which means they spend most of their reproductive
lives—approximately three decades—trying to prevent pregnancy. GUTTMACHER INST.,
UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://www.guttmacher.org/factsheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states. Even with advances in contraception, no
contraception is 100% reliable at eliminating the risk of unintended pregnancy. See id. In
the United States in 2011, 45% of pregnancies were unintended, and of those unintended
pregnancies, 42% of them ended in abortion. Id. As noted above, in 2017, 862,320 abortions
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more than 30 million women have had a legal abortion in the United
States. 148 One way to visualize this number, Professor Watson explains,
is “if all these women came together . . . in 2018, they would replace the
population in the entire states of Texas, Nevada, and Maine.”149 A
different way to visualize this number is “if all the women who ended
pregnancies with legal abortion services between 1973 and 2014 were
still living, they would be 25% of adult women in the United States.”150
In total, approximately 862,320 abortions took place in 2017.151
In terms of how ordinary abortion is, not only do women commonly
make the choice to have an abortion, but they choose it for many of the
same reasons—“having a baby would dramatically change their life [by]
interfering with work, school, or their ability to care for” their existing
children; they cannot afford to have a baby; and they would rather not be
a single parent or are experiencing problems with their spouse or
partner.152 Abortion is also ordinary in that it is a routine medical
procedure and consistent with the practice of medicine—a patient
requests a doctor bring her body back to its natural or usual state, and
the doctor uses a drug or procedure to do so.153
Although the abortion rights cases and public narrative rarely reflect
it, the range of women who rely on the abortion right is diverse. In two of
the Court’s more recent abortion cases, attorneys sought to make this
point. In one amicus brief in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, more
than one hundred attorneys and law students explained how exercising
their constitutional right to abortion affected their educational access,
provided them with professional freedom, and played a critical role in
their lives as attorneys.154 One senior public defender described how she
was able to continue building her career and specialty because she was
were performed in the United States. INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 12. In 2014, slightly more than half of abortion patients were using contraception
during the month they experienced an unintended pregnancy. Id.; see also COHEN & JOFFE,
supra note 59, at 14–15, 216 (stating that abortion remains very common in the
U.S.—almost one million per year—even though it is declining likely due to increased
contraceptive use, contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act, and possibly due
to women self-managing their abortions).
148. WATSON, supra note 26, at 19.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12.
152. WATSON, supra note 26, at 20.
153. Id. at 20–21.
154. Brief of Janice Macavoy, Janie Schulman, and Over 110 Other Women in The Legal
Profession Who Have Exercised Their Constitutional Right to an Abortion as Amici Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2016) (No.
15-274) (reaching the Supreme Court as Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292 (2016)).
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able to have an abortion after she had recently returned to work from
maternity leave.155 In a similar amicus brief in June Medical Services v.
Russo, attorneys, law students, and other legal professionals argued that
their reliance on abortion had been critical to their professional lives.156
One attorney who had two children at the time described how she was
able to continue building her family law practice because she was able to
have an abortion.157 Although amicus briefs hardly ever make headline
news, these attorneys’ briefs were “remarkable” because attorneys wrote
them not for women in need but for themselves.158
In addition to helping demonstrate women’s widespread reliance on
the abortion right, making known how often women choose abortion and
the range of women who choose abortion is necessary to helping members
of society recognize their own reliance on abortion being legal and
accessible.159 For a moment, take women who have had an
abortion—whether privileged or unprivileged—out of the picture. As the
Casey Court recognized, “people” manage their personal and professional
lives in reliance on legal abortion being available if their contraception
fails.160 Although they may not have an abortion themselves, they benefit
from it being legal and accessible. Professor Watson refers to these people
as “abortion beneficiaries.”161
Men who did not want to have a child are the most obvious group of
“abortion beneficiaries.”162 In addition, everyone who has not lost their
“daughter, sister, mother, friend, or colleague” to an illegal or unsafe
abortion is a beneficiary.163 Parents who did not have to raise their
teenage daughter or son’s baby as well as anyone who experienced a
better childhood than they would have had if their family’s income or
energy was pushed past the breaking point because of another child are
155. Id. at 19–20.
156. Brief for Michele Coleman Mayes, Claudia Hammerman, Charanya Krishnaswami,
and 365 Other Legal Professionals Who Have Exercised Their Constitutional Right to an
Abortion as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (Nos. 18-1323 and 18-1460).
157. Id. at 15–16.
158. Emma Green, The Power of Making Abortion Personal, ATLANTIC (Jan. 8, 2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/01/texas-abortion-attoneys-brief/423351/.
Of
course, the briefs also offered the justices a bridge between the Court and the women
whose lives would be affected by the Court’s decision. Suffering is not universal, and
judges are more likely to empathize with people if they are like them. Kathleen Woodward,
Calculating Compassion, 77 IND. L.J. 223, 230 (2002).
159. See WATSON, supra note 26, at 19 (explaining that learning about how often women
choose abortion can change how people think about it).
160. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
161. WATSON, supra note 26, at 26.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 27.
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also beneficiaries.164 Even people who truly do not know someone who
has had an abortion but have been able to enjoy sex because they were
not constantly afraid that a contraceptive failure would result in a child
are beneficiaries.165 Most people do not realize they are an abortion
beneficiary because they do not know that women in their lives have had
an abortion because they have not told them.166 Thus, recognizing and
incorporating the privileged abortion experience would not only help
demonstrate women’s widespread reliance on the right, but it also could
help illuminate society’s widespread reliance on it.
Of course, one of the challenges to demonstrating widespread
reliance on abortion is the abortion stigma. The abortion stigma has
contributed to a vicious cycle in society where women who have an
abortion feel stigmatized and are less likely to share their experience
with abortion which, in turn, ingrains the abortion stigma. If society
understood that abortion has become common and ordinary—and there
is widespread reliance on the right—that understanding would
contribute to a virtuous cycle where women who have an abortion feel
less stigmatized and are more likely to share their experience with
abortion, which in turn would reduce the abortion stigma.
Historically, women talked about abortion with their partners,
relatives, close friends, and doctors.167 Abortion was a topic of
conversation, “an open secret,” meaning women spoke about it discreetly
and selectively, but they did so openly.168 As historian Professor Leslie
Reagan explains:
Emphasizing the ‘silence’ surrounding abortion inaccurately
represents the history of abortion and ignores what women did
say in other arenas; women talked about abortion often. . . . They
did not proclaim their abortions in open, political forums, but
they did speak of their abortions among themselves and within
smaller, more intimate spaces. Women talked about abortion in
‘private’ spaces, at home, and in the semiprivate, semipublic
spaces of medicine such as drug stores, doctors’ and midwives’
offices, hospitals, and birth control clinics. Discussion of abortion,
like other female experiences of reproduction, was part of female
life and conversation. These shared experiences, rooted in biology
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 28. “In a study of over 4,000 women obtaining abortions at hospitals and
clinics across the country, 58% of them agreed with the following statement: ‘I need to keep
this abortion a secret from my close friends and family.’” Id.
167. See, e.g., REAGAN, supra note 60, at 21.
168. Id. at 19, 21.
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but socially created and culturally understood, helped forge the
bonds of gender within social groups.169
In fact, evidence shows there was widespread and popular acceptance of
abortion, despite its illegality and “the official views of medicine and
religion.”170 For ordinary people, abortion was part of daily life.171
In contrast, more recently, abortion has become “clandestine,”
thereby masking women’s widespread reliance on it and contributing to
the abortion stigma.172 “Women who have abortions generally [do not]
talk about them,” and, naturally, people who oppose abortion rights are
far less likely to hear about a woman having an abortion than people who
support abortion rights.173 In fact, about 40% of Americans say they do
not know a woman who has had an abortion, which is unlikely given how
often women choose abortion.174
One of the ironies of Roe’s privacy approach is that there is a dearth
of abortion stories, except those that take center stage in abortion rights
cases and discourse that involve women who must navigate abortion
restrictions and limited access to abortion care. Dr. Meera Shah, a family
medicine doctor and chief medical officer of Planned Parenthood Hudson
Peconic in New York, relayed an experience she had with a woman that
helps capture women’s reluctance to share their abortion experience even
with loved ones.175
Dr. Shah was walking down the aisle of a Target in South Carolina
and bumped into an elderly woman who she recalled looked like Mrs.
Santa Claus.176 The woman saw that Dr. Shah had a stethoscope and
asked her whether she was a nurse.177 Dr. Shah told her that she was a
doctor specializing in sexual reproductive health and then reluctantly
informed her that she also provided abortion care.178 The woman “froze,”
but as a few people passed them, she leaned in and whispered to Dr.
Shah, “I’ve had an abortion,” and after a long pause said, “[i]n fact, I’ve
had two.”179 She explained that with her first abortion she was young,

169. Id. at 21.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 22.
172. WATSON, supra note 26, at 19.
173. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 33. In the Turnaway Study, one-third of women did not
tell anyone about their abortion, except the man with whom they were involved. Id. at 104.
174. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 300–01.
175. SHAH, supra note 87, at 1–5.
176. Id. at 1.
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id. at 2–4.
179. Id. at 4.
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and with her second abortion, she had already had two children.180 “My
husband had no idea. He still has no idea,” she said.181 Dr. Shah thanked
the woman for sharing a piece of her life with her, and before they went
their separate ways, the woman touched Dr. Shah on the arm and
whispered, “You’re the only one I’ve told.”182 “Ever?,” Dr. Shah asked.183
“Ever,” she said.184
Traditional stereotypes based on women as self-sacrificing mothers
and their sexuality being for procreation purposes give women who
choose to have an abortion good reason to anticipate abortion stigma. 185
In fact, some form of abortion stigma has been around as long as abortion
has been available. As early as the 1800s, when abortion was available
to women before quickening, abortion was stigmatized as associated with
“out-of-wedlock sex, promiscuity, and prostitution.”186 By the late
nineteenth century, there were growing concerns that “white, middle
class women were rejecting their [childbearing] ‘roles’”—women who
wanted abortions were considered “frivolous, self-indulgent, and smallminded.”187 During the twentieth century, before the Court decided Roe,
abortion was thought of as “criminal, dirty, and harmful to women” in
light of the “back alley” abortions culture.188 Even after Roe and nearly
180. Id. at 4–5.
181. Id. at 5.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 305; see also The Bad Mother, supra note 78,
at 180, 184. Professor Courtney Megan Cahill has applied “disgust theory” to abortion.
Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 413–14
(2013). She explains that, when people experience disgust in connection with abortion, it is
not because of any act or harm involved with abortion, but rather, it is a reaction to seeing
women “out of place.” Id. at 409, 413–14, 439. Specifically, a woman who has an abortion is
challenging the assumption that she is supposed to be a mother. Id. at 414, 440. Because
motherhood is seen as a woman’s essential role, seeking or having an abortion is a woman’s
decision to renounce that role, and she gets stigmatized for being “inferior to ideals of
womanhood.” Id. at 414. According to Professor Cahill, “abortion provokes disgust because
it is thought by some to disrupt gender norms.” Id. at 430. In other words, abortion stigma
is related to a woman having non-procreative sex and not taking on the role of caring for
children. Professor Kristin Luker notes that, historically, abortion was not viewed as
morally problematic or taboo because it was associated with something akin to infanticide.
Id. at 442–43. Rather, it was morally problematic or taboo because it meant “‘getting caught
in the consequences of sexuality.” Id. at 443 (citing KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 129 (1984)). In this regard, sex, not abortion (or the death of a
child), was the issue. Id. According to Professor Luker, on the surface, the abortion debate
is the embryo’s fate, but what is actually at issue is the meaning of women’s lives. Id. at
443.
186. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 308.
187. Id. at 308–09.
188. Id. at 309.
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five decades of legal abortion, the social stigma persists. Abortion is still
associated with women being “promiscuous, sinful, selfish, dirty,
irresponsible, heartless or murderous.”189 In fact, even women who
support abortion rights continue to not want to associate with it because
of the stigma attached to it.190
Demonstrating widespread reliance on abortion would help
destigmatize abortion, which would help improve women’s health and
encourage more women to share their stories with family and friends.191
It is well established that the abortion stigma carries with it unnecessary
and harmful consequences for women. Women who experience abortion
as a stigmatizing event may delay the procedure, thereby increasing
“health and legal obstacles” to abortion.192 Women who experience
abortion as a stigmatizing event also have an increased desire to keep
the experience a secret.193 Women who keep their abortion a secret report
“insomnia, panic attacks, and anxiety.”194 Despite abortion being a
frequent need among women and the prevalence of abortion, many
women will not discuss their abortion even when they are in the circle of
people who love them.195 The abortion stigma can also be associated with
“psychological distress and poor mental and physical health outcomes.”196
Although abortion is a topic regularly visited in law, law too can
produce and reinforce the abortion stigma.197 For example, in Gonzales v.
Carhart, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Act.198 In so doing, the Court wrote, “[w]hile we
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to
189. Id. at 307 (citing Anuradha Kumar et al., Conceptualizing Abortion Stigma, 11
CULTURE, HEALTH, & SEXUALITY 625, 629 (2009)).
190. WATSON, supra note 26, at 19.
191. See Effective Storytelling of Abortion Experiences: Evaluating the Impact of the 1 in
3 Campaign, ADVOCATES FOR YOUTH (Sept. 2012), http://www.1in3campaign.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Effective-Storytelling-of-Abortion-Experiences-1-in-3Campaign.pdf.
192. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 306; see also The Bad Mother, supra note 78,
at 181, 184.
193. See The Bad Mother, supra note 78, at 184; Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at
311.
194. The Bad Mother, supra note 78, at 184; Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 311.
195. See WATSON, supra note 26, at 17–18 (“Many women have abortions, and many
women keep quiet about it.”); id. at 220 (“I applaud women who donate personal narratives
for public discussion, but as a student once put it, ‘I don’t want to “shout my abortion.” I
just want to be able to mention it when it’s relevant.’”).
196. Katie Woodruff et al., Experiences of Harassment and Empowerment After Sharing
Personal Abortion Stories Publicly, CONTRACEPTION: X, 2020, at 1.
197. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 317–18.
198. 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007); see also Strand, supra note 145, at 125 n.53.
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abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression
and loss of esteem can follow.”199 The Court’s language is based on and
reinforces negative stereotypes about women related to their “judgment
and moral authority” and suggests that women need the state to help
them “make appropriate decisions about their own healthcare.”200
Similarly, state legislatures produce or reinforce the abortion stigma
when they pass restrictions on abortion. For example, in one study,
authors examined a Texas law that requires women to undergo an
ultrasound before they obtain an abortion.201 After reviewing documents
associated with the law from the time it was a bill to the time the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its decision overturning a
preliminary injunction and reinstating the law, the authors concluded
that the law reinforced abortion stigma based on two invalid
constructions.202
First, the law was premised on the notion that women seeking an
abortion did not and could not already know enough about their
pregnancies to make the abortion decision; women purportedly needed
the ultrasound “facts” to make the abortion decision.203 In fact, empirical
research demonstrates that women make the abortion decision based on
their own expertise with respect to their life plans, financial means, and
relationship status.204 Second, the law conveyed that abortion providers
are untrustworthy and that they would withhold objective information
the ultrasound conveys “but for this law.”205 In fact, empirical research
shows that ultrasound viewing does not dissuade women from having an
abortion, and women are able to make decisions about their pregnancies
without the state and an ultrasound technician.206
199. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citation omitted).
200. Weitz & Kimport, supra note 33, at 10; see also Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2088
(“In the wake of the Court’s decision in Carhart, woman-protective arguments
proliferated—both in antiabortion discourse and in mainstream press coverage of the
abortion debate.”).
201. Weitz & Kimport, supra note 33, at 10.
202. Id. at 10–20.
203. Id. at 18.
204. Id.
205. Id. The abortion stigma also extends to abortion as a medical procedure even
though, as Professor Watson describes, abortion is ordinary medically. WATSON, supra note
26, at 20. It is safe and routine and consistent with medicine’s goal: with a patient’s consent,
the doctor returns her body “back to its baseline state.” Id.; see also Lisa H. Harris et al.,
Physicians, Abortion Provision and the Legitimacy Paradox, 87 CONTRACEPTION 11, 11
(2013) (stating that abortion providers are trapped in a “legitimacy paradox” because they
“exist in public discourse as dangerous, deviant or illegitimate practitioners, despite the
fact that they have provided safe abortion care to many millions of US women since Roe v.
Wade”).
206. See Weitz & Kimport, supra note 33, at 18–19.
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In light of the way that law and policy produce and reinforce the
abortion stigma, one might expect that successful court challenges to
these laws would help reverse the abortion stigma. However, overturning
laws in court or even succeeding in repealing laws in the legislature does
not address the abortion stigma that portrays women as “passive,
vulnerable, and incapable of making” the abortion decision.207 A new
discourse that reflects the “normality of choosing abortion” is necessary
to reverse the stigma that surrounds abortion.208
Organizations such as We Testify and Shout Your Abortion
encourage women to speak out about their abortions and maintain
websites to increase the spectrum of women’s abortion stories in the
public sphere and reduce the abortion stigma.209 Online and social media
campaigns such as the “1 in 3 Campaign,” the celebrity driven
#YouKnowMe, and the UltraViolet campaigns also encourage women to
open up about their abortion experience.210 To be sure, even though five
times as many women will have an abortion compared to the women who
will receive a breast cancer diagnosis each year, we will likely never see
a “Fun Run for Abortion.”211 However, demonstrating widespread
reliance on abortion and attempting to start a reverse discourse about
abortion does not require broadcasting abortion stories in such a
fashion.212 In fact, as history demonstrates, there is power in sharing
stories openly, even in person-to-person conversations.213
Of course, abortion is a personal decision, and women should have
complete autonomy to decide who they share their stories with, if anyone.
However, personal disclosure is a key component to normalizing subjects

207. Id. at 20–21.
208. Id. at 21.
209. WE TESTIFY, https://wetestify.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021); SHOUT YOUR
ABORTION, https://shoutyourabortion.com/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
210. Scott Skinner-Thompson et al., Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 COLUM.
L. REV. ONLINE 126, 145 (2016); Ellen Friedrichs, Four Ways to Destigmatize Abortion in
Everyday Conversations, REWIRE NEWS GRP. (May 20, 2019, 8:26 AM), https://
rewirenewsgroup.com/article/2019/05/20/four-ways-to-destigmatize-abortion-in-everydayconversations/.
211. WATSON, supra note 26, at 30.
212. In one exploratory study that sought to document the positive and negative
experiences of women who have shared their abortion stories publicly (publishing an article,
speaking with a journalist, sharing their story on social media, speaking at a public rally,
or giving testimony at a legislative hearing), four out of five participants reported a positive
experience that motivated them to continue sharing their stories, despite some of them
receiving harassment or suffering other negative incidents after they shared their story
publicly. Woodruff et al., supra note 196, at 1.
213. Friedrichs, supra note 210.
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that are shrouded in stigma or shame.214 Take breast cancer, for example.
In the 1950s, Fanny Rosenow wished to print a notice about a breast
cancer support group in the New York Times.215 The society editor told
her that the newspaper could not publish the word “breast” or “cancer.”216
Fast forward to 2013, and the New York Times published Angelina Jolie’s
opinion editorial explaining her decision to undergo a prophylactic double
mastectomy and describing her breast reconstruction surgery.217
Although the pink ribbon is now an internationally recognized symbol for
breast cancer awareness, breast cancer was not a topic of discussion until
the late twentieth century.218 Only after personal disclosures that began
with First Lady Betty Ford did discussions about breast cancer become
normalized.219
Personal disclosure can also be a key component to advancing a
social, legal, and political agenda. “Coming out” has proven central to
advancing LGBTQ+ civil rights after the community long faced
inadequate legal protection and endured social stigma.220 LGBTQ+
people coming out to family, as well as “friends, parents, teachers,
students, bosses, [and] complete strangers,” has been key in advancing
LGBTQ+ rights in both legal and political arenas.221 As Professor William
Eskridge has noted, “the LGBTQ rights movement relied on [members of
the community] coming out . . . to change social attitudes.”222 Likewise,
the Human Rights Campaign, which has promoted the National Coming
Out Day for decades, maintains that “[w]hen people know someone who
is LGBTQ, they are far more likely to support equality under the law.
Beyond that, our stories can be powerful to each other.”223
In short, there is a “prevalence paradox” where abortion in America
is concerned.224 Despite widespread reliance on abortion in terms of how
many women rely on abortion and how many people benefit from abortion
being legal and accessible, abortion rights law and abortion rights
discourse often do not reflect it.225 The abortion rights narrative focuses
on the most vulnerable women, or women without the abortion privilege,
214. See CAROL SANGER, ABOUT ABORTION: TERMINATING PREGNANCY IN TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY AMERICA 215–16 (2017).
215. Id. at 214.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Skinner-Thompson et al., supra note 210, at 142.
221. Id. at 142–43.
222. Id. at 143.
223. Id.
224. WATSON, supra note 26, at 19.
225. See id.
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and by its very nature the focus is off of women with the abortion
privilege.226 Acknowledging how common and ordinary abortion is,
including by women with the abortion privilege, would help demonstrate
widespread reliance on abortion, which is crucial to the stare decisis
argument to uphold Roe and necessary to reverse the abortion stigma
cycle. Until the abortion rights discourse reflects that abortion has
become “ordinary” among women, the abortion issue will persist as
extraordinary.
B. Including Abortion as Ordinary Health Care in the Public Narrative
On January 22, 2021, abortion rights supporters marked Roe v.
Wade’s 48th anniversary on social media by asking participants to
#ReimagineRoe.227 The campaign urged participants to imagine a world
in which abortion is accessible, affordable, and destigmatized. 228 In
asking participants to imagine a world in which every woman has the
abortion privilege, the #ReimagineRoe campaign underscored the
absence of abortion as a form of ordinary health care from the public
narrative about abortion.229 The current abortion rights narrative, which
plays to the undue burden standard to highlight how restricted abortion
has become for many women,230 is necessary inside the courtroom, but
the public narrative need not be so constrained. In light of the way that
the abortion debate and abortion itself has changed, enhancing the public
narrative to include abortion as a form of ordinary health care would help
reinforce that women have the knowledge to decide the outcome of their
pregnancies without state interference and counteract the antiabortion
strategy that suggests women need protection from abortion. Not
everyone is willing to see abortion as ordinary health care today, but they

226. See Jesudason, supra note 36, at 3.
227. Jessica Corbett, 48 Years After Landmark Ruling, Advocates Push to
#ReimagineRoe and Build Abortion Justice, COMMON DREAMS (Jan. 22, 2021), https://
www.commondreams.org/news/2021/01/22/48-years-after-landmark-ruling-advocatespush-reimagineroe-and-build-abortion.
228. Id.
229. Id.; see FOSTER, supra note 5, at 24 (“Abortion-rights advocates often hold up the
extreme cases—the woman with a violent partner, the woman with a life-threatening
illness, the 14-year-old girl raped by a relative, the woman whose fetus wouldn’t survive
more than a few moments after birth. The motivation might be to try to evoke sympathy
for someone in such dire circumstances. But the message communicated may be that
abortion is an extreme remedy for an extreme situation. Instead, . . . abortion can be a
normal part of planning a family and living a meaningful life.”); COHEN & JOFFE, supra
note 59, at 218 (“There is a better way, and what’s heartbreaking about the current
situation in this country is that it’s painfully obvious that this better way already exists.”).
230. See FOSTER, supra note 5, at 24.
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may be open to the idea in the future if we draw attention to the fact that
abortion can be, should be, and is like other medical procedures.231
In the past few decades, the terms of the abortion debate have
changed. Professor Laurence Tribe once described the abortion debate as
a “clash of absolutes” where abortion rights supporters fought for the
right to choose, while abortion rights opponents defended the right to
life.232 Although these positions remain part of the abortion discourse,
once the campaign to pass a constitutional amendment that would ban
abortion stalled in the 1970s, both sides of the abortion divide began to
focus on passing or defeating incremental restrictions that make abortion
harder to obtain.233 In so doing, both sides shifted their arguments to
emphasizing the costs and benefits of abortion and laws restricting it for
women, families, and larger society.234
For the antiabortion side, Casey made clear that the Court would
protect the abortion right because women’s equal participation in society
was based on their ability to control their reproductive decisions and safe
and legal access to abortion, so it shifted its strategy to demonstrating
that abortion is supposedly harmful to women and leads to “depression,
anxiety, and suicidal thoughts.”235 In fact, antiabortion advocates have
sought to increase the abortion stigma by depicting it as “deviant and
immoral.”236 Although not accepted by any leading medical or mental
health organizations, antiabortion advocates have created a mental
health condition called the “post-abortion syndrome.”237 In addition,
2,000 crisis pregnancy centers discourage women from obtaining
abortions by telling them they will experience “psychological and
physical harms.”238 Groups like Care Net believe, “we can no longer hope
that the courts and legislatures will protect women from the abortion
system.”239 Even in forward-thinking areas like San Francisco,

231. Cf. Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy Death Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 353, 378–79 (1996) (“The narrative strategy necessary to write a history of the
present in the face of the counternarratives produced in the legal process requires a bold
willingness to speak the unspeakable, to tell the story that no one now wants to hear in the
hope that future audiences will be more receptive.”).
232. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 3 (1992); ABORTION
AND THE LAW, supra note 60, at 1.
233. ABORTION AND THE LAW, supra note 60, at 2–3.
234. Id. at 2, 5.
235. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 4; see also id. at 123–24.
236. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 309.
237. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 100.
238. Id.
239. ABORTION AND THE LAW, supra note 60, at 142.
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California, antiabortion activists have placed billboards that proclaim
“Abortion Hurts Women.”240
The antiabortion side’s shift in strategy is most evident in its
legislative agenda, which has sought to restrict or regulate every aspect
of abortion and has aggressively pushed the premise that abortion harms
women, and women need protection from it.241 Women protective-type
laws have proliferated across the country and include “informed consent”
laws, required waiting periods, and mandatory ultrasounds.242 They also
include targeted regulation of abortion providers, including admitting
privileges laws and requirements that abortion facilities maintain the
same standards as ambulatory surgical centers—facilities that specialize
in elective, outpatient surgery.243
For the abortion rights side, it shifted its strategy to focus on
pregnant women’s suffering when they cannot obtain an abortion or
when they face substantial obstacles to obtaining abortion.244 This latter
focus makes sense as a legal strategy. Broadly speaking, the American
legal system is built on recognizing, protecting, and providing relief for
victims.245 In addition, as noted above, under the undue burden standard,
abortion rights are won or lost based on how burdensome abortion
restrictions are for women.246 If judges understand women’s suffering,
they may offer their sympathy or compassion and try to alleviate that
suffering in the form of relief from antiabortion laws.247
Although the abortion rights side’s legal narrative must focus on
demonstrating how abortion restrictions pose a substantial obstacle for
women, the public narrative does not need to be so constrained. On the
240. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 100. These billboard campaigns have also targeted the
African American community with billboards that read “Black children are an endangered
species” and “The Most Dangerous Place for an African American is in the Womb.”
Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2057.
241. COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 10 (“[A]nother strategy of the anti-abortion
movement—enacting new legislation that regulates every aspect of abortion”); see FOSTER,
supra note 5, at 21; see also Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 309.
242. Abortion Stigma, supra note 107, at 300 n.15.
243. See ABORTION AND THE LAW, supra note 60, at 125.
244. See Jesudason, supra note 36, at 3 (stating that the abortion rights narrative often
concentrates on the burdens women face, the hardships they endure, and their
powerlessness in the face of restrictions on abortion). Cf. COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at
9 (“[M]edia attention has focused mostly on the threats that the anti-abortion states
pose. . . .”).
245. A victim is defined as “a person subjected to cruelty, oppression, or other harsh or
unfair treatment or suffering death, injury, ruin, etc., as a result of an event, circumstance,
or oppressive or adverse impersonal agency.” Laura Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client
Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 288 (2001).
246. See supra Part II.
247. Woodward, supra note 158, at 228–30.
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one hand, narratives that communicate pain and suffering to elicit
compassion, empathy, and sympathy have been a key to progressive
narratives.248 In fact, such narratives played a role in securing abortion
rights. Before Roe, part of the reason the abortion rights narrative was
successful in achieving criminal law reform was because it portrayed
women as victims “in a way that was palpable to the white, middle-class
majority.”249 The narrative focused on women confronting an illegal
abortion after a man had raped her or a family member had molested
her, or when her pregnancy presented severe issues to her health or the
health of the fetus.250
On the other hand, narratives that communicate pain and suffering
can undermine a broader social justice movement.251 As an initial matter,
such narratives often do not reflect the broader public and social
movement values in contemporary American culture, including
independence, autonomy, agency, and equal rights.252 In addition, in the
248. Id. at 228–29.
249. The Scarlet Letter, supra note 51, at 297.
250. Id.
251. Jennifer L. Dunn, The Politics of Empathy: Social Movements and Victim
Repertoires, 37 S OCIO. FOCUS 235, 236 (2004) (“Becoming a victim has its price. . . .”). Legal
scholars have recognized the limitations and harms of a compassionate or pity narrative in
other civil rights contexts. For example, Professor Odeana Neal notes that African
Americans and civil rights leaders used “images and rhetoric that displayed their long[time]
suffering” as one device in their search for equality. Odeana R. Neal, The Limits of Legal
Discourse: Learning from the Civil Rights Movement in the Quest for Gay and Lesbian Civil
Rights, 40 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 679, 695 (1996). Specifically, civil rights images included
young African American men and women being attacked by dogs and nine Black students
entering Little Rock Central High School while surrounded by hostile Whites. Id. According
to Professor Neal, there was a price to pay for using these images to promote the idea that
Whites should pity African Americans and give them special legal protection. Id. Such pity
quickly turned into anger when a new image of African American success emerged. There
was support for the belief that African Americans no longer needed special protection
through policies or programs such as affirmative action because racism did not constitute
a disadvantage, unless that disadvantage reflected similar images and rhetoric. Id. at 695–
96. Similarly, Professor Laura Rovner has examined the limitations and harms of a
compassionate narrative in the disability rights context. See generally Rovner, supra note
245. The Americans with Disabilities Act places the “individual with a disability” at the
center of the legal inquiry, but a person with a disability, defined as someone who is
impaired and substantially limited in “one or more ‘major life activities’” conjures up an
image of people with disabilities who deserve pity because they are “broken, weak, unable
to function,” or suffer from personal misfortune. Id. at 248 n.3, 250. At the same time, a
person with a disability may not see herself or himself in this way, and it may even be the
“antithesis” of how she or he sees themselves. Id. at 252. Enforcing civil rights under
disability law then can create or reinforce its own stereotypes in ways that are not limited
to the litigation. Id. at 288. In the fight for equality, people with disabilities may be forced
to adopt the very stereotypes that they had hoped to eradicate when Congress pas sed the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Id.
252. See Dunn, supra note 251, at 239, 245.
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abortion rights context, such narratives can inadvertently bolster
antiabortion propaganda that suggests abortion harms women, and
women need greater protection from abortion.253 Finally, even if a
narrative that communicates pain and suffering inspires temporary
assistance in law, if a court invalidates an abortion restriction or a
legislature repeals a law, those legal actions will not address the public
stereotype that women who seek abortions are victims or incapable of
making decisions about their pregnancies and reproduction or the
abortion stigma.254 To address the negative stereotypes about women
who seek an abortion, the narrative must also reflect that abortion is safe
and beneficial for women and that women have the knowledge and
capabilities to make decisions regarding the outcomes of their
pregnancies.255 In other words, the narrative should include abortion as
a form of ordinary health care.
Women’s experience with abortion as a form of ordinary health care
is simply not part of the abortion rights narrative even though abortion
can and does take place this way.256 As discussed above, the privileged
abortion experience is not relevant under the undue burden standard,
and the abortion rights side has not sought to incorporate it into its public
strategy. Nor has the privileged abortion experience emerged organically
as part of the public narrative. In fact, when women are brought together
for abortion storytelling, they are inclined to tell other women’s
stories—the stories of women who have limited access to abortion.257
When women tell someone else’s story, they remove their experience from
the narrative. They also take their personal stake out of the fight for the
abortion right and remove one more connection people can have to
abortion.258
253. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 3–4 (“Many restrictions on abortion are passed with the
justification that they make abortion safer, or prevent women who might experience regret
and psychological harm from getting an abortion.”).
254. Weitz & Kimport, supra note 33, at 21.
255. Id. One of the other consequences of a victim narrative is that abortion providers
are cast as predators. See id. When women are viewed having the knowledge and capability
of making decisions regarding the outcomes of their pregnancies, abortion providers will be
less likely to be seen as at odds with women or engaged in predatory or financially
advantageous positions in providing abortion care. Id.; see also Pamela D. Bridgewater,
Legal Stories and the Promise of Problematizing Reproductive Rights, 21 L. & LITERATURE
402, 403 (2009) (“[T]he key to reproductive justice is not our mastery of the doctrine but our
mastery of the stories that we recover and reconstruct.”).
256. See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 219 (“There are states around the country
where this ideal is already bearing fruit.”).
257. Jesudason, supra note 36, at 4.
258. Id. In addition, of course, women should have the space to tell their own story about
abortion without professional advocates or privileged women doing it on their behalf—no
matter how well-intentioned they are. See id.
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Provided there is recognition that abortion as a form of ordinary
health care is a privilege, there is power in sharing that experience even
without centering it. It demonstrates by example that abortion is like
other medical procedures when it is stripped of the layers of state
intervention. It also demonstrates that women can decide the outcome of
their pregnancies—without regret—in consultation with medical
professionals and with use of medical technology and advancements
when they have access to health care and are not constrained by social
conditions like economic insecurity and racial injustice that might shape
the decision.259
First, abortion is ordinary health care in that it is like other medical
procedures and is safe and enhances a woman’s life and future. In 2020,
the Turnaway Study demonstrated that any suggestion that abortion is
not safe or that abortion harms women physically or emotionally is
false.260 As noted above, the Turnaway Study examined how abortion
affects women by comparing women who had an abortion to women who
wanted an abortion but were turned away from an abortion because they
were too late.261 During their in-depth, ten-year investigation, the
authors interviewed more than a thousand women and followed-up with
them every six months for more than five years to understand how
receiving or being denied an abortion affected their lives.262 Women who
had an abortion experienced better health and life satisfaction compared
to women who were denied an abortion.263
In terms of their physical health, where the two groups of
participants experienced different outcomes, they were to the detriment
of women who were denied an abortion. Specifically, as noted above, two
of the participants who were denied an abortion died as a result of
childbirth-related causes.264 Other women who were denied an abortion
were more likely to experience complications from childbirth, extending
over the next five years, including increased chronic head and joint pain,
and hypertension.265 Women who were denied an abortion were also more
259. Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2050, 2055, 2090–91; see Skinner-Thompson et al.,
supra note 210, at 147; Weitz & Kimport, supra note 33, at 21.
260. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 21.
261. Id. at 6.
262. Id. at 6–7.
263. Id. at 21. Serious complications from abortion—whether medication or
surgical—are rare. Id. at 142–43. The risk of a major complication from abortion that would
result in needing surgery, a blood transfusion, or time in a hospital is less than one quarter
of 1%. Id.
264. Id. at 149–50. According to the Centers for Disease Control national data, one in
160,000 women who has an abortion will die compared to one in 11,300 women who gives
birth will die. Id. at 142.
265. Id. at 147.
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likely to self-report poorer health when asked to rate their overall
physical health.266
In terms of their mental health, where the two groups of participants
experienced different health outcomes, again, they were to the detriment
of women who were denied an abortion. Specifically, women who were
denied an abortion experienced greater anxiety and stress as well as
lower self-esteem and life satisfaction in the short run.267 Fortunately, in
the long run, the two groups of participants experienced no differences in
their mental health.268 The author of the study made clear that this latter
result should not be interpreted as both groups were unhappy.269 Rather,
the author makes clear that both groups experienced improvement in
their mental health over time, pointing to women’s resiliency.270
Finally, in terms of women’s life satisfaction and family well-being,
where the two groups of participants experienced different outcomes,
once more, they were to the detriment of women who were denied an
abortion. Specifically, women denied an abortion experienced reduced
employment, increased reliance on public assistance, increased
household poverty, increased chances that they would be single parents
raising children without family support, and reduced chances of being in
a very good relationship years later.271 In short, abortion is ordinary
health care and like other medical procedures in that it enhances
women’s physical health, mental health, and life satisfaction.
Second, when abortion is accessible, affordable, and free from
unnecessary government interference, abortion is administered as
ordinary health care. In fact, largely missing from the public narrative
about abortion is how abortion itself has changed in the last two decades
because of the availability and use of medication abortion.272 Medication
abortion involves a pregnant woman taking two drugs—Mifepristone
(also known as RU-486) and Misoprostol.273 Many women may prefer
medication abortion over surgical abortion because it is noninvasive, and
women can complete it at home or in a chosen setting.274 In states that
are not hostile to abortion, women can consult with doctors via

266. Id. at 147–48.
267. Id. at 108, 115–16.
268. Id. at 108–09, 127–28.
269. Id. at 127.
270. Id. at 108–09, 127–28.
271. Id. at 165, 185, 238–39.
272. See The Availability and Use of Medication Abortion, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (June
16, 2021), https://www.kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/the-availability-and-use-ofmedication-abortion/.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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telemedicine, and doctors can virtually prescribe medication abortion. 275
Since 2000, when the U.S. Food and Drug Administration approved
medication abortion, use of it has greatly increased, even as the overall
abortion rate has decreased.276 In 2017, almost 40% of abortions were
medication abortions.277 Medication abortion reinforces the position that
women are capable of not only making the decision to have an abortion
but also effectuating that decision in their homes.278
Finally, abortion is ordinary health care in that, contrary to the
abortion stigma, not all women have a “difficult” time making the
abortion decision.279 Both sides of the abortion debate benefit from a
narrative built on abortion being a difficult decision. If abortion is a
difficult decision for abortion rights supporters, they appear to be
considering the potential human life involved. If abortion is a difficult
decision for antiabortion proponents, it supports their position that
women need protection from abortion, and state intervention is both
necessary and desired. Even the Supreme Court seems to take comfort in
abortion being a difficult choice. In 1992, in his concurring opinion in
Casey, Justice Stevens referred to the abortion decision as a “traumatic”
decision.280 In 2007, in the Court’s majority opinion in Gonzales, Justice
Kennedy suggested the abortion decision was a “difficult and painful

275. See Susan Rinkunas, A Bitter Pill, MARIE CLAIRE (Jan. 13, 2021), https://
www.marieclaire.com/politics/a35203155/pandemic-abortion-telemedicine/.
276. The Availability and Use of Medication Abortion, supra note 272 (citations omitted).
277. Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.
guttmacher.org/print/evidence-you-can-use/medication-abortion.
278. See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 222. When medication abortion is
geographically accessible, affordable, and unrestricted, medical professionals are allowed
to be creative in the same way medical professionals are in other fields and can make
abortion care more accessible. In New York, Gynuity Health Projects is involved in a
pioneer effort that mails Mifepristone and Misoprostol to a patient at home. Id. To start,
the patient reaches out to the clinic from her telephone or computer and consults with the
doctor. Id. She receives orders for an ultrasound and blood test at a general health care
clinic—not abortion specific. Id. Once the doctor reviews her ultrasound and blood test
results, she is mailed Mifepristone and Misoprostol and takes them. Id. She then has a
virtual follow-up appointment. Id. This process is more cost effective and convenient and
eliminates the patient having to deal with a potentially hostile environment at a local
abortion clinic. Id. “[S]uccess rates are comparable to in-clinic appointments, and [patients]
report high degrees of satisfaction.” Id. In April 2021, the Biden Administration announced
that the FDA would no longer require that medical providers dispense medication abortion
in person; providers in some states are now allowed to prescribe abortion medication via
telemedicine and send the medication by mail. Kate Smith, Biden Administration to Lift
Abortion Pill Restriction Amid Pandemic, CBS NEWS (Apr. 13, 2021, 11:30 AM), https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/abortion-pill-restrictions-lifted-pandemic-fda/.
279. WATSON, supra note 26, at 50–52.
280. Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 916 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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moral decision.”281 In her dissent in Gonzales, Justice Ginsburg also
suggested that for most women “abortion is a painfully difficult
decision.”282 Because people assume that the abortion decision is difficult
and painful, they assume the aftermath must be difficult and painful,
too.283
However, the vast majority of women do not have a hard time coping
with abortion, and 95% of women who have an abortion report that they
feel they made the right decision.284 According to the Turnaway Study,
almost half of women find the abortion decision “very easy,” “somewhat
easy,” or “neither easy or difficult.”285 Dr. Willie Parker, an abortion care
provider, describes his experience with patients as follows:
One of the cultural falsehoods that I most rail against is this:
each and every abortion is a terrible tragedy and every woman
who chooses to have an abortion is therefore a tragic figure. In
this popular narrative, women are helpless victims—and not
clear-eyed individuals making a sensible choice to benefit
themselves and the people around them. I know, from seeing
women every day, how far this is from being true. Most of the
women I see are utterly matter-of-fact about what they’re
doing. . . . It may be difficult in a misogynist culture to regard
281. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
282. Id. at 183 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
283. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 101.
284. Id. at 124; Lindy West, Foreword to SHOUT YOUR ABORTION, at ix (Amelia Bonow
& Emily Nokes eds., 2018).
285. FOSTER, supra note 5, at 304; WATSON, supra note 26, at 53–54. As Philosophy
Professor Bonnie Steinbock has recounted:
Frankly, I am sick and tired of this particular piety. The decision to have an
abortion is not inevitably agonizing, wrenching, or traumatic—at least, not in my
experience. . . . At the time, I was living with a man with whom I was very much
in love, but who I knew was not as much in love with me. I did not think about the
embryo at all; for me, a five-week-old embryo is not the kind of being to which one
can have moral obligations. Rather, I thought that if I had the child, my real
purpose would be to get my boyfriend to marry me, and that would be incredibly
manipulative. Thus, for me, the abortion decision was not difficult. I do not wish to
minimize the anguish an abortion decision causes many women. Indeed, there are
situations in which I would find abortion terribly difficult, despite my pro-choice
leanings. If we’d been engaged or married, but not ready to have a child, I would
have had a lot more trouble deciding what to do. Nevertheless, to assume that the
decision to have an abortion is always difficult not only ignores the experiences of
women like me, but worse, implies that women who do not find the decision difficult
are somehow deficient psychologically or morally. And that is a canard women can
live without.
Id. at 51.
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women who freely choose sex and who freely choose to have
abortions when needed as free agents taking their lives into their
own hands. But the alternative is to see them as less than fully
human and requiring of paternalistic intervention.286
Notably, there is widespread support among Americans for abortion
to remain legal and for abortion to be treated as a form of ordinary health
care.287 In 2018, PerryUndem conducted a poll of unusual depth with
respect to abortion.288 First, similar to other polls, the results showed
that a strong majority of Americans believe abortion should be legal.
Seventy-two percent said they did not want the Court to overturn Roe,
and only a small fraction of participants said state or federal politicians
(4%) or the Supreme Court (9%) as opposed to “some combination of the
woman, her partner, and her doctor,” should make this decision.289
Moreover, in terms of how women should experience abortion,
respondents said women should receive medically accurate information
(96%), staff should be nonjudgmental (80%), women should not endure
burdens such as waiting periods (81%), abortion care should be available
in her community (80%), and abortion care should be covered by
insurance (67%).290 In addition, respondents said women should be
supported by their loved ones (88%), and not have shame (75%) or guilt
(73%), and they would support a friend or family member who had an
abortion (88%).291
In short, although the undue burden standard constrains the legal
narrative about abortion, it does not constrain the public narrative.
Provided the public narrative acknowledges that abortion as a form of
ordinary health care is a privilege, including abortion as ordinary health
care in the public narrative helps demonstrate that abortion is safe, it is
administered like other medical procedures, and it enhances women’s
health and life satisfaction. It also powerfully demonstrates that women
have the knowledge and are capable of making decisions regarding the
outcomes of their pregnancies without state intervention. At the same
time, it helps counteract the antiabortion strategy that avows abortion
harms women, or women need protection from abortion. Finally, abortion
as ordinary health care is consistent with public support. Even though

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

WATSON, supra note 26, at 58–59.
See COHEN & JOFFE, supra note 59, at 231–32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not everyone may be willing to see abortion that way today, they may be
more receptive to the idea if we begin to tell them that story.292
C. Equality and Addressing Oppression from Within
After Casey, sex equality became a recurring theme in legal
arguments and political arguments in support of the abortion right.293 To
advance an equal rights argument with integrity and to coalesce a base
of support around it, however, the abortion rights movement needs to
systematically recognize and reckon with the inequalities among the
women who make the abortion decision. Put another way, there must be
concerted efforts to address oppressions related to abortion that come
from the outside but also that come from within.294 The abortion privilege
framework is designed to help facilitate such efforts. As a start, abortion
privilege aptly describes how some women experience abortion, and
abortion privilege recognizes the inequality among women who make the
identical decision to have an abortion. In addition, the abortion privilege
framework is designed to both preempt the deprioritization of women
without the same privilege and make clear to privilege holders that
maintaining the abortion privilege perpetuates their inequality, too.
The Roe Court held that the right to privacy encompasses a woman’s
abortion decision,295 but since Casey, sex equality has become a common
thread in abortion rights legal arguments.296 In Casey, the Court
reaffirmed Roe’s essential holding, but in addition to relying on the right
to privacy, the Court explained that women have been able to participate
equally in society’s economic and social developments because of their
ability to make reproductive decisions and the availability of abortion.297
The Court made clear that women must be able to shape their destiny
292. See Sarat, supra note 231, at 378–79.
293. Sex equality was advanced as an argument in favor abortion rights before Roe, but
it is increasingly common now to hear equality, as well as privacy, asserted to support the
abortion right. See, e.g., Brief of Equal Protection Constitutional Law Scholars Serena
Mayeri, Melissa Murray, and Reva Siegel as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 141 S. Ct. 2619 (2021) (No. 19-1392); Raceing Roe, supra note 21, at 2047–48; see also Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights
Claims that Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875, 1877–78 (2010) [hereinafter Roe’s
Roots].
294. See, e.g., Angela Mae Kupenda, For White Women: Your Blues Ain’t Like Mine, but
We All Hide Our Faces and Cry—Literary Illumination for White and Black Sister/Friends,
22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 67, 95 (2002) (explaining how a white woman can identify as
white and female but cannot be connected with womanhood and humanity-based justice if
she is oppressed and an oppressor).
295. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
296. See supra text accompanying note 293.
297. Planned Parenthood Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
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based on their own ideas about their role in society, irrespective of how
dominant the state’s vision of a woman’s role in society has been in our
history and culture.298
Shortly after Casey, in 1993, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg was
confirmed as an Associate Justice to the Supreme Court, and she became
the most vocal member of the Court to advance the position spotlighted
in Casey that a woman’s ability to make the abortion decision was
essential to her equality.299 Most notably, in her dissent in Gonzales v.
Carhart, she characterized the abortion right as a matter of equality not
privacy:
As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion
restrictions is a woman’s “control over her [own] destiny.” “There
was a time, not so long ago,” when women were “regarded as the
center of home and family life, with attendant special
responsibilities that precluded full and independent legal status
298. Id. at 852. In his concurring opinion in Casey, Justice Harry Blackmun also
explained that when a state restricts a woman’s right to abortion, the restriction implicates
constitutional guarantees of gender equality. He wrote:
State restrictions on abortion compel women to continue pregnancies they
otherwise might terminate. By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the
State conscripts women’s bodies into its service, forcing women to continue their
pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances, provide years of
maternal care. The State does not compensate women for their services; instead, it
assumes that they owe this duty as a matter of course. This assumption—that
women can simply be forced to accept the “natural” status and incidents of
motherhood—appears to rest upon a conception of women’s role that has triggered
the protection of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
299. On September 18, 2020, Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg passed away from
complications of metastatic pancreatic cancer. Linda Greenhouse, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Supreme Court’s Feminist Icon, Is Dead at 87, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2020) https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/us/ruth-bader-ginsburg-dead.html. Justice Ginsburg, only
the second woman to sit on the U.S. Supreme Court, was a lifelong women’s rights advocate
and a steadfast supporter of abortion rights. Id. As early as 1993, during her Supreme Court
confirmation hearing, she explained that Casey recognizes the abortion decision involves a
woman’s body and life; men are not similarly situated to women in this regard. She made
clear that a woman’s choice must control, and imposing restrictions on that choice would
disadvantage her on the basis of sex. JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS 396 (Neal Devins & Wendy L.
Watson eds., 1995). Her testimony was consistent with the views she expressed in her early
publications that a woman’s ability to control the abortion decision was not only a matter
of individual autonomy but also essential to women’s equality. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 383
(1985) (“[I]n the balance is a woman’s autonomous charge of her full life’s course . . . her
ability to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, self-sustaining,
equal citizen.”).
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under the Constitution.” Those views, this Court made clear
in Casey, “are no longer consistent with our understanding of the
family, the individual, or the Constitution.” Women, it is now
acknowledged, have the talent, capacity, and right “to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation.” Their
ability to realize their full potential, the Court recognized, is
intimately connected to “their ability to control their reproductive
lives.” Thus, legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion
procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of
privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine
her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.300
With a now solidly conservative Supreme Court that has expressed
skepticism and hostility towards the abortion right as currently
recognized,301 one might expect to see more legal arguments centered on
equality-based reasoning.302 As Professor Reva Siegel has long
maintained, equality can be and is expressed explicitly or implicitly in a
variety of constitutional frameworks—the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Privileges and Immunities
Clause.303 Indeed, since Casey, a number of prominent legal scholars have
analyzed how equality arguments help illuminate liberty values, and
there has been a steady drum beat for the Court to adopt an equality
framework for abortion rights.304
Sex equality has also become a common thread in abortion rights
political arguments. Equal rights is a “master frame” that is
foundational, adaptable, and appealing, so social movements often
invoke it or use it in an effort to resonate with potential movement
300. 550 U.S. 124, 171–72 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
301. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S. Ct. 2494 (2021). Justice Amy Coney
Barrett, Justice Ginsburg’s replacement on the Court, has ruled to uphold restrictions on
abortion as an appellate judge, and as a law professor she signed an ad criticizing Roe v.
Wade as “barbaric.” Alexandra Hutzler, Amy Coney Barrett Could Rule on Multiple
Abortion Cases if Appointed to the Supreme Court, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 23, 2020, 1:13 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/amy-coney-barrett-could-rule-multiple-abortion-cases-ifappointed-supreme-court-1541750; see also Interview by David Greene with Sarah
McCammon, A World Without Legal Abortion: How Activists Envision a “Post-Roe” Nation,
NPR (Oct. 27, 2020, 5:02 AM), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/927862869.
302. See Roe’s Roots, supra note 293, at 1900–02.
303. Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 816 (2007) [hereinafter
Sex Equality].
304. Id. at 833–34; see, e.g., Priscilla J. Smith, Give Justice Ginsburg What She Wants:
Using Sex Equality Arguments to Demand Examination of the Legitimacy of State Interests
in Abortion Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 377, 403–04 (2011).
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participants.305 In the abortion rights context, the equality argument
makes sense for messaging purposes. First, it takes account of the
physical aspects of reproduction.306 In addition, the argument takes
account of the social aspects of reproduction in that it raises skepticism
around the traditional or conventional female roles and the ways custom
structures female and male roles in society.307 The equality argument
also recognizes that a woman’s ability to time motherhood is necessary
to her health and welfare, sexual freedom, education and employment,
and ability to manage relationships and family.308 Finally, most people
who support the equality argument oppose legal restrictions on abortion
because “they have conscripted the lives of poor and vulnerable women
without similarly constraining the privileged.”309
To move forward with an equality argument with integrity and to use
it as a framework to build a broad base of support around the abortion
right, systematically acknowledging and addressing the inequalities
among women who make the decision to have an abortion is necessary.310
The abortion privilege framework is designed to help. To begin with,
abortion privilege describes how some women experience abortion
relative to others. That is, although women with the abortion privilege
and women without the abortion privilege make the identical decision to
have an abortion, their experiences are vastly different. Only some
women have trouble accessing abortion care. Only some women bear the
brunt of the public stigma and shame associated with legal restrictions
on abortion. Only some women are the face associated with abortion
because of abortion rights law and the abortion rights narrative.
In addition, the abortion privilege framework is designed to prompt
efforts to equalize the abortion experience and address social conditions
that shape it, and importantly, preempt any deprioritization of
historically marginalized women. The mainstream women’s rights
movement has not always represented or advanced the reproductive
needs and interests of women of color, low-income women, and other
women society has historically marginalized, resulting in a fractured and
305. Dunn, supra note 251, at 239.
306. Sex Equality, supra note 303, at 817.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 819.
309. Id. at 822.
310. To be sure, sex equality arguments in favor of the abortion right are concerned with
equalizing the sex roles between women and men. Id. at 817–18. Nevertheless, as this
Article makes clear, there is no one-size-fits-all abortion experience for women. On the same
token, a one-size-fits-all sex equality victory would produce benefits that are accessible to
some women and illusory for others. In other words, revealing the abortion privilege and
taking inventory of or accounting for women’s experiences in the abortion rights discourse
is an exercise in honesty and utility.
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less organized social movement to support the abortion right.311 In fact,
the mainstream women’s rights movement has taken positions that have
had the effect of deprioritizing historically marginalized women.
For example, in the 1970s, the mainstream women’s rights
movement opposed mandatory informed consent laws before a woman
could be sterilized.312 Although the movement condemned coerced
sterilization, it feared that if lawmakers could interfere with
sterilization, they could interfere with abortion, too.313 At the same time,
however, advocates on behalf of women of color were demanding changes
and protection from sterilization abuses because women of color were
being coercively sterilized throughout the United States sometimes as
part of federally funded family planning programs.314
Similarly, after Roe, the mainstream women’s rights movement chose
to focus on the right to abortion itself instead of barriers to abortion
access, particularly abortion funding bans.315 Although the mainstream
movement opposed funding bans, it was worried about its donors and
grassroots activists who were less concerned about incremental
restrictions.316 The movement was also aware of the increasing racialized
politics and hostility towards welfare and misjudged how the Court
would view these funding bans.317 At the same time, however, abortion
funding bans were of primary importance to women of color and lowincome women because these bans disproportionately hurt nonwhite
women.318 They argued that the bans pushed “poor, minority, and
working women into unwanted childbirth, back-alley abortions, and
unwanted sterilizations.” 319
311. ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 88, at 113; see also Renee Bracey Sherman,
Whitewashing Reproductive Rights: How Black Activists Get Erased, SALON (Feb. 25, 2014,
12:00 AM), https://www.salon.com/2014/02/25/whitewashing_reproductive_rights_how_
black_activists_get_erased/ (“As black feminists from the ‘70s onward sought to expand
racial, gender and economic equality for women of color, they found themselves being left
out of mainstream conversations about equal pay and reproductive rights. Their stories
were left untold in a women’s rights movement, led by mainly white women.”).
312. See ABORTION AND THE LAW, supra note 60, at 47–48.
313. See id.
314. See, e.g., MELISSA MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND
JUSTICE 880 (2015); e.g., Maya Manian, Coerced Sterilization of Mexican-American Women:
The Story of Madrigal v. Quilligan, in REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES 97, 97–
98 (Melissa Murray, Katherine Shaw & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2019); e.g., Relf v. Weinberger,
372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974), vacated, 565 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1977); e.g., Madrigal v.
Quilligan, 639 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1981) (unpublished table opinion).
315. ABORTION AND THE LAW, supra note 60, at 40–41.
316. Id. at 41.
317. Id. at 40–41, 45.
318. Id. at 48.
319. Id.
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Finally, in 2003, the mainstream women’s rights movement began
planning the March for Choice, a massive protest in support of the
abortion right.320 Many women of color leaders in the reproductive justice
movement publicly expressed reluctance to help organize the march after
seeing themes of the white-centric feminism.321 Only after the
mainstream movement agreed to change the name of the march to the
March for Women’s Lives and broaden the scope of the march beyond
abortion to include other reproductive and social justice issues that
prioritized issues of importance to women of color did SisterSong, the
National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health, the Black Women’s
Health Imperative, and the National Asian Pacific American Women’s
Forum agree to help organize the march.322
Given the mainstream women’s rights movement’s history of
deprioritizing women of color, low-income women, and women society has
historically marginalized, there might be hesitation if not resistance to a
call-in to women with the abortion privilege.323 However, to be clear, this
Article is intended to explore openings where recognizing and
incorporating the abortion privilege could redistribute, not overshadow
or compound, the oppressive load women without the abortion privilege
carry in connection with the right.
By using the term privilege, the abortion privilege framework
encourages approaching the abortion issue with an intersectional lens.324
In addition, by using the term privilege, the abortion privilege framework
puts the onus on privilege holders and other stakeholders to reflect on
what role the privilege plays in the abortion experience and what role
privilege plays in maintaining the precarious status quo of the abortion
right. By using the term privilege, the abortion privilege framework also
places the responsibility on the privilege holder and other stakeholders
to work to understand the personal experience of women without the
privilege and to align themselves in private and public with them in a
way that acknowledges their privilege. Thus, the abortion privilege
framework is designed to recognize the inequalities among women who
make the decision to have an abortion and prompt efforts to equalize
them in a way that avoids deprioritizing historically marginalized
women.
320. ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 88, at 242.
321. Id. at 66–67, 242.
322. Id. at 66–67.
323. Id. at 113. Reproductive justice advocates have questioned whether mainstream
white women can appreciate the reproductive justice framework without recentering the
conversation around white women and non-intersectional practices. Id.
324. See Race-ing Roe, supra note 21, at 2033–62 (providing a historical overview of race
and abortion).
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Finally, the abortion privilege framework is designed to highlight for
privilege holders that, although there is risk in confronting the abortion
privilege, maintaining the privilege perpetuates their own inequality. To
be sure, there is risk for privilege holders to talk about the abortion
privilege. Specifically, privilege holders must confront their role as
oppressors or beneficiaries of oppression.325 Similar to any privilege
holder, women with the abortion privilege benefit from the privilege. 326
As discussed above, not only do women with the abortion privilege
experience abortion as a form of ordinary health care, but also they can
more readily avoid suffering from the public stigma, shame, and
oppression associated with abortion. In addition, they can avoid objecting
to the oppression associated with abortion because it is not relevant for
them. Given the strong stigma associated with abortion, they have a
strong incentive to ignore the oppression.
In fact, when women with the abortion privilege observe how women
without the abortion privilege are treated, their observations can coerce
them to “assimilate” into the dominant group norm.327 This assimilation
effect can be seen in other areas of reproduction. For example, privileged
women are indirectly coerced to act in accordance with what is considered
normal maternal behavior to avoid coerced interventions that
unprivileged women experience, including forced cesarean sections and
prosecution for prenatal drug use.328 As Professor Nancy Ehrenreich
explains:
Just as many women in society know . . . the courts are unlikely
to find that a woman has been raped if she was drinking heavily
or wore revealing clothes, so women are becoming aware that
medical and legal authorities will not hear a woman’s objections
to coercive interventions in her pregnancy if she acts
“irresponsibly,” contests medical authority, or seems unwilling to
sacrifice her own well-being to that of her fetus.329
In other words, privileged holders may fear losing their privilege.330
Privileged holders within a subgroup, here women who have had an
abortion, may also implicitly or explicitly become invested in their
325. See WILDMAN, supra note 61, at 97.
326. Wildman & Davis, supra note 27, at 891 (“Members of the privileged group gain
many benefits by their affiliation with the dominant side of the power system.”).
327. Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 300–01 (2002).
328. Id. at 302.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 290.
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privilege.331 However, insofar as there is reluctance to acknowledge the
abortion privilege, the privilege not only undermines equal rights
arguments by maintaining inequality among women who choose
abortion, but the privilege also perpetuates privileged women’s own
inequality.332 That is to say, privilege comes at a price.333
There are two ways that privilege supports and obscures the
subordination a privilege holder experiences. First, when privilege
holders in a subgroup ignore members of the subgroup without their
same privilege, they reinforce the very systems that oppress the
subgroup and limit achieving the subgroup’s overall goal.334 The same
stereotype that benefits privilege holders in one context is the same
stereotype that subordinates the privilege holders in another context.335
Here, when women with the abortion privilege align or assimilate with
the norm that women do not have abortions or women who do not have
abortions are somehow more responsible and moral, that alignment or
assimilation acts as a double-edged sword.336 On the one hand, women
may avoid experiencing abortion in ways similar to women without the
abortion privilege. On the other hand, they perpetuate the perception
that abortion is rare and the stereotype that women who have abortions
are irresponsible or immoral, and incapable of making independent,
rational reproductive health care decisions.337
Second, when privileged holders in a subgroup ignore those without
the same privilege or accept their subordinated status, ideological
investment can occur.338 Ideological investment occurs when privileged
group members come to believe that they deserve their privilege status
but not their overall subordination status, or that they are actually free
from the conditions of the subordination.339 Here, women with the
abortion privilege may convince themselves that anyone without the
331. Id. at 268–69. For example, Professor Ehrenreich points to the white feminist
movement’s success in obtaining workplace reforms and explains that the success came at
the expense of low-income women and women of color who took care of their children and
cleaned their homes. Id. The movement failed to improve their lives, such as with living
wages or affordable day care out of ignorance and an unwillingness to give up the privilege
they had because of the availability of cheap domestic labor. Id.
332. Id. at 306 (“[T]he privilege individuals enjoy comes not just at the expense of
another group, but at their own expense as well.”); Kupenda, supra note 294, at 84 (“[T]he
white patriarchal system kills for white women but also inflicts injury upon them.”); see
Wildman & Davis, supra note 27, at 885.
333. Ehrenreich, supra note 327, at 257.
334. Id. at 257, 282.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 257, 307–08.
337. See id. at 307.
338. Id. at 307, 313–14.
339. Id.
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privilege is deserving of their circumstances and blame them.340
Although they may be internalizing the abortion stigma, they may also
be hiding from their privilege.341 Ideological investment can be seen in
other areas of reproduction, too. Using the example above, for privileged
women to believe that they will not be coerced into having a cesarean
section if they act “responsibly,” they must believe that women who
experienced forced cesarean sections are acting “irresponsibly.”342 Thus,
although there is risk involved in confronting the abortion privilege,
failure to do so not only maintains the status quo’s existing inequalities,
but also perpetuates privileged holders’ own inequality.
In short, as equality arguments find their way into legal and political
arguments in support of the abortion right, there needs to be greater
recognition of, and reckoning with, the inequalities among the women
who make the abortion decision. Although contending with outside
sources of oppression can be all consuming, addressing inside sources of
inequality is essential to advance an equal rights argument with
integrity and to build a base of support around it. The abortion privilege
framework is intended to help describe how some women experience
abortion while preempting the deprioritization of women without the
privilege and making clear for privilege holders that confronting the
abortion privilege is necessary to avoid perpetuating their own
inequality.
V. CONCLUSION
In revealing the abortion privilege, this Article sought to add a new
dimension to the way that we think and talk about abortion, including
the women who choose to have abortions, the ways in which women
experience abortion, and the unequal treatment women receive in
connection with abortion. The Article focused on privileged women
because, by definition, privileged women may not be aware they are
privilege holders and because their experience represents abortion care
as it could be, should be, and is—at least for them. This Article also
sought to explore ways to recognize and incorporate the abortion
privilege into abortion rights law and discourse to help redistribute the
oppressive load that women without the abortion privilege carry and to
shore up the abortion right. Despite the ongoing and seemingly
340. Id. at 313–14 (“This ideological investment in one’s privileged status comes in part
from internalization of one’s own (dominant) group’s norms, and belief that compliance with
those norms is necessary for success.”).
341. Id. at 313.
342. Id. at 314–15.
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intractable nature of the abortion issue, at a time when Roe v. Wade
seems most likely to be overturned, it is worth critically examining and
re-examining the issue. A woman’s employment, education, life
aspirations, and accomplishments are all affected by whether she is able
to have an abortion or must carry a child to term.343

343.

FOSTER, supra note 5, at 165.
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